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Abstract
This Article gives an overview of arbitration litigation in Alabama, in-
cluding the evolution of mental anguish jurisprudence in contract cases,
especially with regard to the automobile and home industries; a proposal
to bring Alabama law in line with controlling authorities through sub-
stantive and procedural reforms; and an appendix listing a decade of
arbitration cases decided by Alabama appellate courts.
I.  Introduction
The Alabama Supreme Court decides more cases on the enforceability
of arbitration agreements than any other court in the country.   Although1
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1999).
one of the authors has examined the unusually high number of Alabama
arbitration cases as part of the political battle between trial lawyers and
business for control of the Alabama Supreme Court,  politics provides2
only a partial explanation for the strange abundance of Alabama arbitra-
tion cases.  A more complete explanation involves legal doctrine as well
as politics.  The doctrinal explanation for the unusually high number of
Alabama arbitration cases, this Article asserts, lies in the seemingly un-
related law of damages for mental anguish.  The strange abundance of
Alabama arbitration cases is primarily caused by an even stranger aspect
of Alabama law: its willingness to award mental anguish damages in con-
tract and warranty actions when there is no evidence of physical injury,
but–bizarrely–only when the claim arises out of an allegedly defective
new auto or home.  No other state has mental anguish law that looks any-
thing like Alabama’s.
Alabama is one of only three states that prohibits the enforcement of
pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements as a matter of law or public
policy.   Arbitration agreements did not become generally enforceable3
in Alabama until 1995, when the United States Supreme Court decided
Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson.   Dobson held that the Federal Ar-4
bitration Act’s (FAA) mandate to enforce arbitration agreements applies
to all such agreements involving interstate commerce.  That is, the FAA
is an example of Congress legislating as far as its permitted reach under
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.   Dobson over-5
ruled Alabama Supreme Court cases that had confined the FAA more
narrowly.  After Dobson, more arbitration agreements in Alabama be-6
came subject to the FAA, leading more Alabama businesses to utilize
arbitration agreements.
From the date Dobson was decided until June 4, 2004, when research
for this Article ended, there have been more than 359 reported cases in
which the Alabama appellate courts ruled on the enforceability of arbitra-
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BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996)7
(holding that a grossly excessive award of punitive damages violates substantive due
process); ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (1993) (establishing monetary caps for punitive damage
awards).  But see Harris Interactive, 2003 U.S. Chamber of Commerce State Liability
Systems Ranking Study, Study No. 17942 (Apr. 4, 2003) (ranking Alabama the third
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S. Energy Homes. v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505 (Ala. 2000) (holding mental8
anguish is recoverable in a warranty action involving a mobile home); Volkswagen of
Am., Inc. v. Dillard, 579 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1991) (holding mental anguish recoverable
in a breach of warranty action involving a new auto); Ala. Power Co. v. Harmon, 483
So. 2d 386, 389 (Ala. 1986) (holding that “mental anguish need not be predicated upon
the presence of physical symptoms”); B&M Homes v. Hogan, 376 So. 2d 667 (Ala.
1979) (holding that mental anguish is recoverable in a breach of contract action
involving a new home).
tion agreements.  About one-half of these cases are unremarkable since
they involve matters that are frequently the subject of arbitration cases
in courts in other states, such as securities transactions, commercial dis-
putes, and employment relationships, among others. However, the re-
maining cases are remarkable both in their frequency and subject matter.
They involve matters that are rarely the subject of arbitration cases in
other states: transactions arising out of the purchase of new manufactured
homes and new autos.  No other jurisdiction, or combination of jurisdic-
tions, reports a similar number of appellate decisions involving the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements in these industries.  This begs the
question of why Alabama appellate courts are faced with so many arbi-
tration cases centered on these two industries.  This question, the authors
argue, is best answered through an understanding of Alabama’s bizarre
law on damages for mental anguish.
Although Alabama once had a well-deserved reputation as a jurisdic-
tion with unusually high punitive damages, constitutional and statutory
reforms have now brought the state within the national mainstream on
punitive damage awards.   By contrast, Alabama remains far outside the7
national mainstream with respect to another type of damage, mental
anguish. Alabama law permits the purchaser of a new auto or home to
sue for breach of warranty or contract and obtain mental anguish damages
without a showing of actual physical injury.   Stated differently, a plain-8
tiff may recover damages for mental pain and suffering in connection
with a defective or damaged auto or home, even though the product does
not injure the plaintiff physically in any way. This Alabama rule is unique
among the fifty states and, curiously, applies only to actions against the
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Prior to 2003, arbitration agreements were used only in transactions involving man-11
ufactured homes, as opposed to site built homes, because the Alabama Supreme Court
generally held the construction and sale of site-built homes to be intrastate in nature,
and thus not subject to the Federal Arbitration Act.  In Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc.,
539 U.S. 52, 123 S. Ct. 2037, 156 L. Ed. 46 (2003), the Supreme Court overruled Ala-
bama decisional law that interpreted the commerce clause powers of Congress too nar-
rowly.  Recent Alabama decisions have enforced arbitration agreements in disputes in-
volving site-built homes because the court has now accepted the notion that the construc-
tion and sale of a site-built home may involve interstate commerce. Elizabeth Homes,
L.L.C. v. Gantt, 882 So. 2d 313, 316-17 (Ala. 2003); Steele v. Walser, 880 So. 2d 1123,
1128 (Ala. 2003); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Saxton, 880 So. 2d 428, 431 (Ala. 2003).
The inability to purchase a product or service without first signing a pre-dispute12
binding arbitration agreement is one factor Alabama courts consider when determining
whether to void an arbitration agreement on grounds of unconscionability.  Am. Gen.
Fin, Inc. v. Branch, 793 So. 2d 738, 751 (Ala. 2000).  Although arbitration agreements
are ubiquitous in manufactured home and auto purchase transactions, to date, no one
has successfully challenged arbitration agreements in such transactions on the basis that
the product could not be purchased anywhere in the state without first signing an arbi-
tration agreement.  See, e.g., Conseco Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Boone, 838 So. 2d 370, 372
(Ala. 2002) (holding that mobile home purchaser failed to prove absence of meaningful
choice when purchasing mobile home subject to arbitration agreement); Jim Burke Auto.
v. Murphy, 739 So. 2d 1084, 1087-88 (Ala. 1999) (holding that purchaser failed to
present evidence of his inability to buy a car from another source without first signing
an arbitration agreement).
new auto and home industries.  Furthermore, unlike punitive damages,
there is no cap or limit to the amount of mental anguish damages that may
be awarded in Alabama, as long as the award is supported by “some”
direct evidence.9
To date, legislative efforts directed at reforming Alabama’s mental
anguish rule have not been successful.   The absence of meaningful10
legislative reform in this area, the authors believe, prompted the auto and
home industries to adopt the use of arbitration clauses as a tort-reform
substitute.  The use of arbitration agreements by these two industries in
Alabama has grown exponentially in recent years.  It is virtually impos-
sible now for Alabama consumers to purchase new automobiles or
homes  without first signing pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements.11 12
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Not surprisingly, other consumer industries have begun using arbitration agree-13
ments, as well.  They can now be found routinely in transactions involving credit cards,
consumer credit, and insurance.  The growth of arbitration in these consumer industries
seems to be a national phenomenon that is occurring in Alabama no faster or slower
than in other states.
The widespread use of arbitration agreements has changed not only
the way these industries do business with their customers, but also the
way Alabama lawyers handle cases in these industries.  Consumer cases
arising out of auto and home transactions, which were formerly litigated,
are now subject to arbitration.  The perception among many practicing
lawyers in Alabama is that, whereas juries often will award significant
mental anguish damages in these cases, arbitrators do so only rarely.
Thus, the value of these cases turns on whether the arbitration agreement
in the transaction at issue is enforceable.  This is precisely why so many
auto and home cases find their way to the Alabama Supreme Court on
the issue of arbitration: the appellate court’s decision can have a six-
figure impact on the value of a case.
Because enforceability of an arbitration agreement is an issue that
must be raised early in a case, before the parties initiate fact discovery,
it is common for lawyers to spend substantial time and money litigating
the arbitration issue before the trial court and on appeal without ever
obtaining meaningful information from the opposing party on the merits
of the case.  In short, these cases are less about the defects in the product
at issue, and more about the question of whether a jury will get to decide
the value of the plaintiff’s subjective mental state.  Arbitration has be-
come the proverbial “tail that wags the dog.”13
The authors contend that the adoption of arbitration agreements by
the auto and home industries was a direct and rational response to Ala-
bama’s peculiar mental anguish damages law.  Because legislative reform
failed to address mental anguish damages, the auto and home industries
contractually changed the rules of the game.  Arbitrators, not juries, now
decide the lion’s share of Alabama’s auto and home warranty and con-
tract cases. This Article demonstrates the connection between the un-
precedented trait of Alabama’s arbitration caseload–its abundance of
cases from the auto and home industries–and Alabama’s unique mental
anguish rule that applies only to the auto and home industries.
This Article begins by discussing the history of mental anguish doc-
trine, explaining why Alabama is out of step with the rest of the country.
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that alone”); Victorian Railways Commrs. v. Coultas, 13 A.C. 222, 226 (1888); Lehman
v. Brooklyn City R.R., 47 Hun. 355, 356 (N.Y. 1888); Throckmorton, Damages for
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A rule that is more consistent with recognized principles, and is supported by better
authority, is that mental suffering, alone and unaccompanied by other injury, cannot
sustain an action for damages, or be considered an element of damages.  Anxiety
of mind and mental torture are too refined and too vague in their nature to be the
subject of pecuniary compensation in damages, except where, as in the case of
personal injury, they are so inseparably connected with physical pain that they cannot
be distinguished from it, and are therefore considered a part of it.
27 AM ERICAN &  ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW  862 (1905).
JOHN D. CALAM ARI &  JOSEPH M. PERILLO , CONTRACTS § 14-5 (3d ed. 1987).15
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).16
It then explores the shortcomings of the rule by demonstrating how men-
tal anguish claims in contract and warranty cases are virtually indefensi-
ble under current Alabama law.  The Article then examines the correla-
tion between reported arbitration decisions and mental anguish damages
law in Alabama.  It demonstrates how Alabama’s unique mental anguish
damages law has precipitated the wide-spread use of arbitration agree-
ments, and ultimately led to the otherwise inexplicable proliferation of
reported decision in this area.  Finally, the Article makes the case for re-
forming Alabama’s mental anguish rule and suggests methods for doing
so.
II.  The History of
Mental Anguish Damages
At English and American common law, mental anguish damages were
not recoverable in tort absent proof of physical injury.   Prior to the14
1850s, there were almost no widely-recognized rules of contract damages
law.   In 1854, the landmark decision of Hadley v. Baxendale  articu-15 16
lated two general rules for contract damages that gained general accep-
tance nearly everywhere:  (1) a plaintiff may recover damages “‘as may
fairly and reasonably be considered . . . arising naturally, i.e., according
to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself;’” and
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CALAM ARI &  PERILLO , supra note 15, § 14-5 (quoting 156 Eng. Rep. at 151).  The17
Alabama Supreme Court adopted the Hadley rules in 1883 and has applied them ever
since.  Daughtery v. Am. Union Tel. Co., 75 Ala. 168 (1883); Cato v. Williamson, 209
Ala. 477, 96 So. 321 (1923).
CALAM ARI &  PERILLO , supra note 15, § 14-5.18
8 R.C.L. § 83 Breach of Contract Generally (1915).19
See 15 AM . JUR. Damages § 182 (1938) (discussing mental anguish damages as20
both Hadley I (general) and Hadley II (consequential) damages); Lamm v. Shingleton,
231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810 (1949) (applying Hadley II damages rule to a mental anguish
claim).
Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 187-88, 254 S.E.2d 611, 616-17 (1979); 821
R.C.L. § 83 Breach of Contract Generally (1915).
Stanback, 254 S.E.2d at 617.22
See W. Union Tel. v. Choteau, 28 Okla. 664, 115 P. 879 (1911) (citing cases).23
(2) a plaintiff also may recover damages “‘such as may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time
they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.’”   The17
first Hadley rule (Hadley I) describes what courts refer to as general
damages, and the second Hadley  rule (Hadley II) describes what courts
refer to as special or consequential damages.   Mental anguish damages18
are sometimes (but rarely) considered Hadley I damages;  mental19
anguish damages are more frequently recognized as special or consequen-
tial damages under Hadley II.   For the most part, courts refused to award20
mental anguish damages under Hadley II.   The principle rationale21
offered was that parties did not contemplate mental anguish damages in
connection with a contract’s breach.22
A.  Early Contract Doctrine
In the late nineteenth century, as the industrial revolution began to
transform the legal landscape, different kinds of cases presented them-
selves to American courts.  At issue were claims arising out of then
modern inventions.  Telegraph cases were among the earliest.  In numer-
ous decisions across the country, plaintiffs filed suits against telegraph
companies alleging breach of contract and negligence, claiming that the
telegraph companies failed to deliver important telegram messages in-
volving the serious illnesses or deaths of loved ones.   Applying existing23
law, recoveries were very slim.  Plaintiffs could recover only nominal
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Id.; W. Union Tel. Co. v. Stewart, 79 So. 200, 201, 16 Ala. App. 502, 503 (1918).24
55 Tex. 308 (1881).25
In addition to Texas and Alabama, Louisiana, Washington, Nevada, Tennessee,26
North Carolina, Iowa, and Kentucky adopted the Texas doctrine. Choteau, 115 P. at 880.
Choteau, 115 P. at 882.27
Francis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 263, 59 N.W. 1078, 1080 (1894); W.28
Union Tel. Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748, 9 So. 823, 826 (1891).
W. Union Tel. Co. v. Westmoreland, 151 Ala. 319, 324, 44 So. 382, 383 (Ala.29
1907); CALAM ARI &  PERILLO , supra note 15, § 14-6.
See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Peagler, 163 Ala. 38, 50 So. 913, 913-14 (1909)30
(holding a message that said “please let me hear from you at once by wire” did not
support a mental anguish award since the telegraph company was not placed on notice
of special circumstances).
See, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Crumpton, 138 Ala. 632, 36 So. 517, 520 (1903)31
(holding that the consequence of the breach was within the contemplation of the parties
since the content of telegraph message placed telegraph company on notice of the
importance and urgency of the message); 15 AM . JUR. Damages § 182 (1938) (“To
authorize a recovery in any case the damage must have been within the contemplation
of the parties and the defendant must have had notice when the contract was made that
mental anguish might result from a default or negligence in its performance.”).
S. Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612, 615-16, 36 S. Ct. 410, 411, 60 L. Ed. 825,32
827-28 (1916).
damages (i.e., the price of a telegram).   Beginning in Texas in So Relle24
v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,  nine states–including Alabama–25
modified the law to permit mental anguish recoveries in telegraph cases.26
This change has been referred to as the Texas doctrine.27
Early courts were concerned that by expanding the law to permit the
award of mental anguish damages, the “floodgates” would open and lead
to intolerable and vexatious litigation.   To address this concern, courts28
permitted mental anguish awards only in very narrow settings, where the
telegram message set forth information concerning the death or serious
illness of a close relative.   Telegram messages communicating any other29
information would not support a mental anguish award.   Doctrinally30
speaking, courts generally permitted mental anguish damages under
Hadley II, finding that the parties “contemplated” mental anguish dam-
ages in cases where the telegraph sender placed the telegraph company
on notice of the potential for serious mental harm through the subject
matter of the message (death or serious injury of a relative).   Even with31
this limitation, the remaining states and nearly every federal court to
consider this issue rejected the Texas doctrine.32
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See, e.g., Kansas City, Memphis & Birmingham R.R. v. Foster, 134 Ala. 244, 3233
So. 773 (1902) (where a man was wrongfully ejected from a train into a town
quarantined under a yellow fever epidemic, court permitted consequential damages
(mental anguish) award).
See id. at 778; see also CALAM ARI &  PERILLO , supra note 15, § 14-5 (discussing34
the application of Hadley v. Baxendale in common carrier cases).  State courts were later
limited in their ability to apply mental anguish damages against common carriers and
telegraph companies through the enactment of national legislation–the Interstate
Commerce Act–that regulated rates and damages in these industries through tariff laws.
S. Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612, 36 S. Ct. 410, 60 L. Ed. 825 (1916);  CALAMARI
&  PERILLO , supra note 15, § 14-6.  In a recent case, the Alabama Supreme Court
precluded the recovery of mental anguish in a lost luggage case involving an airline
based on tariff laws.  Ex parte Delta Air Lines, 785 So. 2d 327 (Ala. 2000).
RICHARD A. LORD , W ILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 53:78 (2004) (Obligation as to35
Guest’s Comfort and Safety).
Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Recoverability of Compensatory Damages for36
Mental Anguish or Emotional Distress for Breach of Service Contract, 54 A.L.R.4th
901 (1987 & Supp. 2004).
Carter v. Innisfree Hotel, 661 So. 2d 1174, 1179 (Ala. 1995) (innkeeper case);37
Florence Hotel Co. v. Bumpus, 194 Ala. 69, 73, 69 So. 566, 568 (1915) (innkeeper case);
Birmingham Transfer & Traffic Co. v. Still, 7 Ala. App. 556, 565-66, 61 So. 611, 614
(1913) (funeral case).
Cases involving a second modern industry produced similar results.
In the late 1800s, railroads were the principal means of traveling long
distances.  From time to time, passengers were wrongfully ejected from
trains, and left in precarious situations.   Some courts, including Ala-33
bama courts, expanded the law to permit the award of mental anguish
damages in actions involving wrongful ejections from trains.34
Eventually this expansion in the law found a footing in two other types
of cases.  Courts held that guests who were wrongfully ejected from inns
could recover mental anguish damages in contract.   Courts also per-35
mitted mental anguish damages in cases involving the mishandling of
bodies in the context of funerals.   Alabama courts recognized both36
expansions.37
B.  The Shift to Negligence Doctrine
The trend of expanding contract damages to address modern cases lost
favor in American courts beginning in the late nineteenth century and
early twentieth century.  At that time, courts began to reconsider their
approaches and focus instead on negligence law as a method of expanding
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See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 129 L. Ed. 2d38
427 (1994).
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (5th39
ed. 1984). In many situations, mental anguish claims are easily simulated and often exag-
gerated.  W. Union Tel. Co. v. Choteau, 28 Okla. 664, 115 P. 879 (1911) ( citing cases
denying recovery for mental anguish).  Anxiety, despair and humiliation– the indicia
of mental harm–often defy empirical confirmation, and require strong corroborating
evidence.  In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 764 F.2d
1084, 1087-88 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that a strong showing of causation is required
because mental anguish is subjective and susceptible to fabrication or exaggeration).
Taylor v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981); Clark v. Choctawhatchee40
Elec. Coop., 107 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1959); Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App.
581, 144 S.E. 680 (App. Ct. 1928); W. Chicago St. Ry. Co. v. V. Liebig West, 79 Ill.
App. 567 (App. Ct. 1898); Boston v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 223 Ind. 425, 61
N.E.2d 326 (1945); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman’s Guardian, 232 Ky.
285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1919); Chappetta v. Bowman Transp., 415 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct.
App. 1982); Spade v. Lynn P. Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Bass
v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983); Brisbase v. Kansas City Pub. Servs. Co.,
303 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1957); Bass Shultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131,
447 N.E.2d 109 (1983); Miller v. Baltimore & Ohio S.W. R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E.
499 (1908); Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958); Johnson Freight
Lines v. Tallent, 53 Tenn. App. 464, 384 S.W.2d 46 (App. Ct. 1964).
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, § 54.41
remedies for mental harm.   Even so, three concerns continued to foster38
judicial caution and doctrinal limitations on the recovery of mental
anguish damages in cases where the plaintiff suffered no actual physical
harm: “(1) the problem of permitting legal redress for harm that is often
temporary and relatively trivial; (2) the danger that mental anguish may
be falsified or imagined; and (3) the perceived unfairness of imposing
heavy and disproportionate financial burdens on a defendant,” for remote
consequences based on negligent conduct alone.   Mindful of these39
concerns, courts adopted three different approaches to expand mental
injury claims in negligence actions.
1. The Physical Impact Doctrine
The first extension of the law was to permit mental anguish awards
in negligence cases where there was actual physical contact (even if no
actual physical harm occurred).   The existence of the contact or impact40
between the plaintiff and the object of his suffering was deemed to be
a reliable indicator that mental anguish actually occurred.   This became41
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Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 547.  At least five states continue to adhere to it.  See Lee42
v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Ga. 583, 533 S.E.2d 82 (2000); Shuamber v.
Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991); Anderson v. Schaffler, 242 Kan. 857, 752 P.2d
667 (1988); Deutch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980); Hammond v. Central Lane
Communications Ctr., 312 Or. 17, 816 P.2d 593 (1991).
Keek v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d43
552 (Minn. 1980); Valliancourt v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92
(1980); Hanbrook v. Stokes Bros., 1 K.B. 141 (1925); P.G. Guthrie, Annotation, Right
to Recover Damages in Negligence for Fear of Injury to Another, and Shock or Mental
Anguish at Witnessing Such Injury, 29 A.L.R.3d 1337 (1970 & Supp. 2004).
Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 557.44
Id. at 547; AALAR Ltd. v. Francis, 716 So. 2d 1141 (Ala. 1998); Keck v. Jackson,45
122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979); Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163
(1978); Robb v. Pa. R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); Williams v. Baker, 572
A.2d 1062 (D.C. App. 1990); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457
N.E.2d 1 (1983); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Stadler v.
Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980); Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Mem’l. Hosp., 799
S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1990); Bousum v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843 (1984);
Wetham v. Bismarck Hosp. 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Boucher v. Dixie Med. Ctr.,
a Div. of IHC Hosps., 850 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1992); Jobin v. McQuillen, 158 Vt. 322,
609 A.2d 990 (1992); Garrett v. New Berlin, 122 Wis. 2d 223, 362 N.W.2d 137 (1985).
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912 (1968).46
known as the physical impact doctrine.  Having originated a century ago,
most of the major industrial states followed this rule by 1908.42
2. The Zone of Danger Doctrine
Some courts expanded the physical impact doctrine further to address
circumstances where the plaintiff suffered a near miss, in which death
or serious injury could have resulted had an actual impact occurred.43
This became known as the zone of danger doctrine.  A near miss in a life
and death situation is deemed to be a reliable guaranty of real mental
harm.   The zone of danger doctrine came into use around a hundred44
years ago; fourteen jurisdictions continue to utilize it.45
3. The Relative Bystander Doctrine
Many jurisdictions expanded this approach even further into what
became known as the relative bystander doctrine.  Under this rule, a
plaintiff can recover mental anguish damages if he witnesses the death
or serious injury of a loved one.   This rule is somewhat reminiscent of46
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See, e.g., Culbert v. Sampson’s Supermarkets, 444 A.2d 433, 436-37 (Me. 1982).47
Croft v. Wicker, 737 P.2d 789 (Alaska 1987); Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644,48
257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814 (1989); Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985);
Fineran v. Pickett, 465 N.W.2d 662 (Iowa 1991); Lejeune v. Rayne Branch Hosp., 556
So. 2d 559 (La. 1990); Cameron v. Pepin, 610 A.2d 279 (Me. 1992); Stockdale v. Bird
& Son, Inc., 399 Mass. 249, 503 N.E.2d 951 (1987); Nugent v. Bauermeister, 195 Mich.
App. 158, 489 N.W.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1992); Entex, Inc. v. McGuirie, 414 So. 2d 437
(Miss. 1982); Maguire v. State, 254 Mont. 178, 835 P.2d 755 (1992); James v. Lieb,
221 Neb. 47, 375 N.W.2d 109 (1985); Buck v. Greyhound Lines, 105 Nev. 756, 783
P.2d 437 (1989); Wilder v. Keene, 131 N.H. 599, 557 A.2d 636 (1989); Frame v.
Kothair, 115 N.J. 638, 560 A.2d 675 (1989); Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457, 797 P.2d 246
(1990); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d
85 (1990); Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983); Sinn v. Burd, 485
Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979); Reilly v. United States, 547 A.2d 894 (R.I. 1988); Kinard
v. Augusta Sash & Door Co., 286 S.C. 579, 336 S.E.2d 465 (1985); Ramsey v. Beavers,
931 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1996); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993); Gain v.
Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash. 2d 254, 787 P.2d 553 (1990); Heldreth v. Marrs, 188 W.
Va. 481, 425 S.E.2d 157 (1992); Contreras v. Carbon County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 843 P.2d
589 (Wyo. 1992).  Alabama rejected the bystander doctrine in Gideon v. Norfolk S.
Corp., 633 So. 2d 453, 454 (Ala. 1994).
AALAR Ltd. v. Francis, 716 So. 2d 1141 (Ala. 1998).  Prior to this decision,4 9
confusion existed over the state of Alabama law on this issue.  Alabama had long
adhered to the common law rule that a recovery for mental anguish was not permitted
under a negligence theory unless the injury accompanied actual physical harm.  See,
e.g., Holcombe v. Whitaker, 292 Ala. 430, 318 So. 2d 289 (Ala. 1975).  However, in
1981, the Alabama Supreme Court decided Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, 400 So.
2d 369 (Ala. 1981), which arguably adopted the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress.  See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 599 n.4 (Tex. 1993) (listing Alabama
in the minority of jurisdictions that have adopted a right to recover for negligently
the old telegraph rule in contract actions, since a recovery cannot be had
unless the victim is personally affected by the death or serious injury of
a relative.  Courts adopting this rule have reasoned that the requirement
of the plaintiff witnessing the death or serious injury of a relative is a
reliable indicator of actual mental injury.   Approximately one-half of47
the states utilize this rule.48
C.  Contract Doctrine in Alabama
Unlike the rest of the country, Alabama continued to use contract
instead of negligence doctrine to address mental anguish claims during
the twentieth century.  Alabama did not adopt a modern standard for
mental anguish claims in negligence actions until 1998, when it adopted
the zone of danger doctrine.49
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inflicted emotional distress).  But see Allen v. Walker, 569 So. 2d 350, 352 (Ala. 1990)
(rejecting tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress in Alabama).  Francis later
harmonized Taylor with other Alabama decisions, and held that the Taylor decision is
consistent with the zone of danger doctrine.  Francis, 716 So. 2d at 1147.
224 Ala. 655, 141 So. 630 (1932).50
Murphy, 141 So. at 631.51
Id. at 632.52
Id. at 631 (quoting 8 R.C.L. § 83 Breach of Contract Generally (1915)).53
Id. (citing Birmingham Water Works Co. v. Vintner, 164 Ala. 490, 51 So. 3565 4
(1910)).  The court also cites a second exception to the general rule precluding mental
anguish damages in contract: “where the breach of contract is tortious, or attended with
personal injury, damages for mental anguish may be awarded.” Id. (citing Vinson v.
S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 188 Ala. 292, 66 So. 100 (1914)).
Id. (citing Western v. Olathe State Bank, 78 Colo. 217, 240 P. 689 (1925)).55
1. The Murphy Rule
Alabama’s modern approach to mental anguish claims in contract
originated in a 1932 decision involving the breach of a home warranty.
In F. Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Murphy,  a contractor’s poor50
construction of a new home led to numerous roof leaks, which eventually
caused the home purchaser to become ill.   The Alabama Supreme Court51
upheld a mental anguish award on these facts.   Murphy is important52
because it marks the first time that Alabama applied a new legal test to
determine whether mental anguish damages were recoverable in an action
of assumpsit (breach of contract in modern parlance).  This test has no
name, but this Article refers to it as the Murphy rule.  Under this rule,
Alabama courts will award mental anguish damages if the contract meets
the following standard:
Yet where the contractual duty or obligation is so coupled with matters of
mental concern or solicitude, or with the feelings of the party to whom the
duty is owed, that a breach of that duty will necessarily or reasonably result
in mental anguish or suffering, it is just that damages therefor be taken into
consideration and awarded.53
Murphy held that this rule was an exception to the general rules of
damages.   The court recognized that the breach of contract damages will54
not, to use Hadley I words, “naturally cause” mental harm.   The court55
also recognized that mental harm is “too remote” and not within the
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Id.56
By contrast, other states were moving from contract to negligence law to handle57
mental anguish damages.  See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 541, 114
S. Ct. 2396, 2403, 129 L. Ed. 427, 439 (1994) (stating that, because jurisprudence of
the Federal Employers Liability Act “gleans guidance from common-law developments,”
the statute encompasses the common law recovery for mental anguish damages).
8 R.C.L. § 83 Breach of Contract Generally (1915).58
Id.59
Id.60
“contemplation of the parties.”   Thus, the court acknowledged that56
mental anguish is not normally a recoverable element of damage under
either Hadley I or II.  Beginning in Murphy, Alabama then moved in its
own unique direction by continuing to treat mental anguish damages as
a matter for contract law and by creating its own novel contract
doctrine.57
However, the novel doctrine at the core of Alabama’s unique direction
rests on a mistake. The Murphy court misunderstood the passage quoted
above.  The passage quoted in Murphy originated in a 1915 legal
encyclopedia entitled Ruling Case Law.  There, the unnamed author58
discussed mental anguish damages that “naturally result” from breach
of contract (i.e., Hadley I damages), and those that are otherwise
“contemplated by the parties” (i.e., Hadley II damages).   The passage59
quoted by Murphy represents only a portion the encyclopedia text.  The
Murphy court overlooked the fact that the author was discussing
circumstances that could bring certain types of contract claims, which
are personal in nature, within the Hadley II “contemplation of the parties”
test.   The full text of the encyclopedia article, set forth below, empha-60
sizes in italics the excerpt cited by Murphy:
Breach of Contract Generally.–It is a general rule that damages for mental
anguish cannot be recovered in an action for breach of contract, except in
those cases where the breach amounts, in substance, to an independent,
willful tort, although in some states mental anguish or suffering is a proper
element of damage in actions for breach of contract, at least where it may
be said that such anguish is the natural result of the breach.  While, as a
general rule, mental anguish is not a proper element of damage in actions
for breach of a contract, a distinction is drawn between contracts having,
on the one hand, a direct relation to property or pecuniary matters, and those
having, on the other, relation to the feelings and sensibilities of the parties
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Id. (emphasis added).61
Alabama cases pre-dating Murphy correctly understood how mental anguish6 2
damages fall within the Hadley II “contemplation of the parties” test.  See, e.g., W.
Union Tel. Co. v. Swindle, 208 Ala. 303, 94 So. 283 (1922) (“In order to justify the
recovery of damages for mental distress it is essential that such distress should have been
within contemplation when the contract was made.  The company must have either
knowledge or notice that from dereliction of duty in the premises it is reasonable to
anticipate that mental distress may result.”).
A handful of cases in the 1930s relied on the Murphy rule.  See Becker Roofing63
Co. v. Pike, 230 Ala. 289, 292, 160 So. 692, 695 (1935); Ala. Water Serv. Co. v.
Wakefield, 231 Ala. 112, 115, 163 So. 626, 628 (1935); Holley v. Vaughan, 226 Ala.
249, 251, 146 So. 396, 397 (1933).
Hill v. Sereneck, 355 So. 2d 1129 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978).64
entering into them, and from the nature of which it is known when the
contract is made that great mental suffering will result from its breach.  And
so, while under the general rule stated, damages are not recoverable for
mental anguish growing out of the violation of an ordinary contract, as, for
example, for the payment of money, yet where the contractual duty or
obligation is so coupled with matters of mental concern or solicitude, or with
the feelings of the party to whom the duty is owed, that a breach of that duty
will necessarily or reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering, it is just
that damages therefor be taken into consideration and awarded.  The reason
why such damages are not generally recoverable is that they are too remote,
and could not have been in the contemplation of the parties when the
contract was made.  But if a person contracts upon a sufficient consideration,
to do a particular thing, the failure to do which may result in anguish and
distress of mind on the part of the other contracting party, he is presumed
to have contracted with reference to the payment of damages of that
character, in the event such damages accrue by reason of a breach of the
contract on his part.61
Thus, the passage quoted by Murphy as an exception to the Hadley
rules was, instead, a discussion of circumstances under which mental
anguish damages could be recovered under Hadley II–where the personal
nature of the contract is “known” by the contracting parties, and thus
“presumed” to be within the “contemplation of the parties.”   To put it62
bluntly, Murphy misread a legal encyclopedia article and developed an
exception to contract doctrine based on this mistaken reading.
The Alabama Supreme Court’s exception in Murphy lay forgotten in
the law for more than forty years.   Then, in 1978, the Alabama Court63
of Civil Appeals resurrected this mistaken rule in a breach of warranty
case involving a home.   The following year, the Alabama Supreme64
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B&M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 376 So. 2d 667 (Ala. 1979).65
Hill, 355 So. 2d at 1132 (applying the Murphy rule); B&M Homes, Inc., 376 So.66
2d at 670-71 (using an application of the Murphy rule).
See, e.g., Liberty Homes, Inc. v. Epperson, 581 So. 2d 449, 454 (Ala. 1991)6 7
(applying the Murphy rule).
S. Energy Homes v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505 (Ala. 2000) (mobile home case);68
Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Dillard, 579 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1991) (auto case); Orkin
Exterminating Co. v. Donavan, 519 So. 2d 1330 (Ala. 1988) (allowing mental anguish
damages in a case where the home is damaged from the breach of a termite bond); see
also Sexton v. St. Clair Fed. Sav. Bank, 653 So. 2d 959 (Ala. 1995) (involving a breach
of construction contract claim where a bank wrongfully disbursed plaintiff’s loan pro-
ceeds to a builder; the court upheld a mental anguish award).  Like the home and auto
industries, the pest control industry has reacted to this extension in the law by requiring
customers to agree to arbitration in connection with the issuance of termite bonds.
See, e.g., Boros v. Baxley, 621 So. 2d 240, 244 (Ala. 1993) (rejecting mental69
anguish damages in a claim for breach of legal services contract); Wellcraft Marine v.
Zarzour, 577 So. 2d 414, 418-19 (Ala. 1991) (rejecting mental anguish damages in
warranty action involving a pleasure craft); United Am. Ins. Co. v. Brumley, 542 So.
2d 1231, 1238 n.4 (Ala. 1989) (noting that mental anguish damages are not recoverable
in a breach of contract action involving an insurance policy); Faith, Hope & Love, Inc.
v. Ala. Bank of Talladega County, N.A., 496 So. 2d 708, 711 (Ala. 1986) (rejecting
mental anguish damages in contract action to establish credit for T-shirt business);
Morris Concrete, Inc. v. Warrick, 868 So. 2d 429, 438-39 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)
(rejecting mental anguish damages in contract action involving commercial
construction).  
The distinction of whether mental anguish damages should be awarded for personal70
contracts as opposed to commercial contracts has been the subject of some criticism.
See, e.g., Giampapa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 64 P.3d 230 (Colo. 2003) (“We do
not adopt the personal/commercial test because it is often difficult to label contracts as
Court recognized the Murphy rule in another home case.   Both courts65
repeated the mistake of the Murphy court by citing the Murphy rule as
an exception to the Hadley rules, as opposed to an expression of the
Hadley II rule.   Modern decisions continue to allow mental anguish66
damages for breach of contract.   In addition to new home cases, the67
Alabama Supreme Court has extended the Murphy rule to contract and
warranty claims involving new mobile homes, termite bonds on homes,
and autos.   Alabama appellate courts have rejected it in other settings.68 69
The primary difference between the Murphy rule and the Hadley II
rule is the way a court analyzes the limits of liability.  Under Murphy,
a court decides the limits of a defendant’s contract liability through the
tort law standard of foreseeability.  According to Murphy, if the contract
is personal in nature,  then the court presumes that mental anguish70
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purely one or the other.”); see also Lloyd W. Gathings, Damages for Mental Anguish:
When, How and How Much?, 1999 ATLA W INTER J. (discussing difficulty in reconciling
differing results in cases where the Murphy rule and its exceptions are applied by
Alabama courts).
B&M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 376 So. 2d 667, 671-73 (Ala. 1979).71
See, e.g., id. (considering a defendant’s post contract conduct in a foreseeability72
analysis); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Donavan, 519 So. 2d 1330, 1333-34 (Ala. 1988)
(same); Lawler Mobile Homes. v. Tarver, 492 So. 2d 297, 306 (Ala. 1986) (same); Ruiz
de Molina v. Merritt & Furman Ins. Agency, 207 F.3d 1351, 1359 (11th Cir. 2000)
(citing cases involving “egregious” breaches of contract that will support a recovery).
KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, § 43.73
CALAM ARI &  PERILLO , supra note 15, § 14-5.74
Shades Ridge Holding Co. v. Cobbs, Allen & Hall Mortgage Co., 390 So. 2d  601,75
611 (Ala. 1980).
716 So. 2d 1141 (Ala. 1998).76
damages are foreseeable and, thus, recoverable.   Importantly, events71
that occur after contract formation are considered in determining whether
mental harm was foreseeable.   This is consistent with tort law, because72
the foreseeability analysis in tort requires a court to consider all events
leading up to and including the injury.   By contrast, under Hadley II,73
the court decides the limits of a defendant’s contract liability through the
contract law “contemplation of the parties” test.  To make this determina-
tion, a court must consider whether the promisor knew or had reason to
know of special circumstances that would give rise to mental anguish
damages at the time the parties entered into the contract.   Conduct of74
the parties that occurs after the contract is formed is irrelevant.
Murphy’s application of the tort law doctrine of foreseeability is
incomplete.  In tort, although the doctrine of foreseebility is often the
starting point for analyzing a defendant’s legal liability, the law imposes
limits to liability.  The flip-side to foreseeability is proximate causation.
Under generally recognized tort standards, the doctrine of proximate
causation defines the outer limits of a defendant’s legal liability as a
matter of law and public policy.   In AALAR, Ltd. v. Francis,  the Ala-75 76
bama Supreme Court articulated Alabama’s modern proximate causation
standard applicable to claims for mental anguish damages in negligence
cases.  That standard limits a plaintiff’s recovery for mental anguish
damages to two situations: (1) where the plaintiff sustained an actual
physical injury, or (2) where the plaintiff was placed in immediate risk
of physical harm by the defendant’s conduct (i.e., a “near miss” within
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Francis, 716 So. 2d at 1147.77
Horton Homes v. Brooks, 832 So. 2d 44, 50 n.7 (Ala. 2001).78
48 Cal. 3d 644, 668, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865, 881, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (1989).79
151 Ala. 319, 324, 44 So. 382, 383 (1907) (citations omitted).80
the zone of danger).   If a plaintiff cannot prove either prong, then a77
defendant cannot be held liable.  In contract cases under Murphy, by
contrast, even though a court begins its analysis with foreseeability, the
doctrine of proximate cause is not applied, leading to potentially limitless
liability.   The problem with this doctrine is obvious.  As the Supreme78
Court of California aptly noted in Thing v. La Chusa, “there are clear
judicial days on which a court can foresee forever, and thus determine
liability but none on which that foresight alone provides a socially and
judicially acceptable limit on recovery of damages for that injury.”79
2. The Hadley II Rule in Alabama
Even though modern decisions in Alabama apply the Murphy rule in
contract and warranty actions, there are a number of older Alabama
decisions that address mental anguish damages utilizing the Hadley II
rule.  In these decisions, Alabama appellate courts recognized that mental
anguish damages should be considered a consequential damage under
Hadley II if the plaintiff can prove that such damages were contemplated
by the parties at the time the contract was formed.  These decisions have
never been overruled and are clearly at odds with Murphy.  For example,
in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Westmoreland, a 1907 case that
predates Murphy, the Alabama Supreme Court laid down the following
rule in telegram cases:
[Mental anguish] damages, notwithstanding their elusive character, are
actual; but they are ordinarily not the natural result of a breach, and thus not
within the contemplation of the parties.  In cases where they are not clearly
contemplated, it would be dangerous and unfair in the extreme to allow
them.  When the message is between persons of a close degree of relation-
ship and relates to exceptional events, such as sickness or death, of such
relations in which a failure to deliver obviously comprehends mental distress
and anguish, we have allowed such anguish as an element of damages.  But
to extend as a natural result the allowance on other occasions “would, in our
judgment, tend to promote and encourage a species of litigation more or less
speculative in its nature, and unjust and oppressive in its results.”80
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4 Ala. App. 580, 587-88, 58 So. 931, 933-34 (Ala. 1912).81
Browning, 58 So. at 932.82
Id. at 933-34.83
168 Ala. 494, 501-02, 51 So. 150, 153 (1909).84
Ferguson, 51 So. at 153.85
Id.86
195 Ala. 379, 70 So. 763 (1915).87
Pullman, 70 So. at 768.88
Id. at 765-66.89
Id. at 767-68.90
Other pre-Murphy cases also correctly apply the Hadley II rule.  In
Browning v. Fies,  the Alabama Supreme Court reversed and remanded81
a case for a new trial where the trial court failed to submit the plaintiff’s
mental anguish claim to the jury.  The defendant breached a contract to
transport the plaintiff and his friends and family from his home to a
church where he was to be married.   The court held that the question82
of mental anguish damages should have been submitted to the jury since
such damages were within the contemplation of the parties.83
In Birmingham Water Works Co. v. Ferguson,  the Alabama Supreme84
Court held that it was not error to instruct the jury that a plaintiff could
recover for inconvenience and annoyance in a breach of contract action
where the defendant failed to provide water to the plaintiff’s residence.85
Such damages were recoverable because they were within the contempla-
tion of the parties.86
In Pullman v. Meyer,  the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a judg-87
ment against a defendant who failed to provide sleeping car accommoda-
tions on a train.   The plaintiff relapsed into mental illness as a result of88
the breach of contract.  The court found that the plaintiff’s special cir-89
cumstances were brought to the attention of the defendant, and that the
plaintiff’s damages were, therefore, recoverable.   In other words, her90
damages were contemplated.
In summary, Alabama’s mental anguish law is muddled.  Two distinct
and divergent lines of cases exist in Alabama on the issue of mental
anguish damages in contract and warranty: cases applying the Murphy
rule, and cases applying the Hadley II rule.  Although the Murphy rule
is dominant in modern decisions, it suffers from three flaws.  First, it was
predicated on the misreading of a legal encyclopedia.  Second, it applies
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Walker Builders, Inc. v. Lykens, 628 So. 2d  923, 924 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993).91
Alabama’s relaxed mental anguish pleading rule conflicts with other settled Alabama
authority.  The relaxed rule originated in Lykens, where the Alabama Court of Civil Ap-
peals held that mental anguish damages are general in nature and do not have to be
specially pleaded.  Id.  Lykens conflicts with Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 9(g),
which requires “special damages” to be specifically stated in the complaint.  Supreme
court decisions from a century ago hold that mental anguish is a special or consequential
damage under the law.  See, e.g., Lay v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 171 Ala. 172, 54 So. 529
(1911) (mental anguish is a special damage); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Crumpton, 138 Ala.
632, 36 So. 517 (1903) (same). Alabama law supports this position as well.  Section
7-2-715, which discusses some of the types of damages available for breach of warranty
under the Uniform Commercial Code, declares that personal injury damages are conse-
quential in nature.  ALA. CODE § 7-2-715(1) (1975).  Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Dillard
held that mental anguish in a breach of warranty action may result in personal injury
damages under this code section.  579 So. 2d 1301, 1305-08 (Ala. 1991).
ALABAM A PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 10.28 (2d ed. 1993).92
See Kmart Corp. v. Kyles, 723 So. 2d 572, 578 (Ala. 1998).93
tort law standards instead of contract law doctrine.  Third, its application
of tort law is flawed in a way that is quite harsh to defendants: Murphy
defines a defendant’s legal liability under the doctrine of foreseeability,
but without applying the necessary corollary to that rule, proximate cause.
III.  The Shortcomings of Alabama’s
Mental Anguish Rule in Practice
This Section discusses the shortcomings of Alabama’s mental anguish
damages rule in practice.  This is done by exploring the practical facets
of a litigated case, showing that at each stage of a case, from beginning
to end, a mental anguish claim is virtually indefensible under current law.
Modern Alabama decisional law does not require a plaintiff to plead
a request for mental anguish damages in the complaint.   A plaintiff can91
file suit against a defendant and, without ever mentioning mental anguish
as an element of damage, receive a jury charge at trial.   This relaxed92
pleading rule makes it difficult to defend a mental anguish claim.  A de-
fendant may not learn about mental anguish damages until trial, where
a jury has the authority to award any amount within its sound discretion.93
The defense of a mental anguish case becomes more difficult after the
pleading stage.  In an action involving a claim for breach of contract or
warranty where mental anguish damages are sought, it is appropriate to
discover and present evidence on the cause and amount (i.e., severity)
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ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (1975).94
ALA. R  . EVID . 503.95
Ex parte Pepper, 794 So. 2d 340, 344 (Ala. 2001) (declining to create an exception96
to the statutory privilege where a party seeks information relevant to the issue of
proximate cause); Ex parte United States Serv. Stations, 628 So. 2d 501, 504 (Ala. 1993)
(finding no exception to privilege where the issue of a party’s mental condition is raised
in a civil proceeding).
ALA. R. CIV. P. 35.97
The denial of a motion to take a mental examination in a mental anguish case in-98
volving the breach of a warranty or contract has never been the subject of a reported
opinion in Alabama.
S. Energy Homes v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505, 519 (Ala. 2000).99
Even though fear will support a mental anguish award under the Murphy rule, fear100
will not support such an award in a negligence case.  S. Bakeries, Inc. v. Knipp, 852
of the damage.  Unfortunately, Alabama law does not permit discovery
of mental records at any level.  Alabama’s version of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege forecloses the discovery of a plaintiff’s psychological
and psychiatric records.   Alabama Rule of Evidence 503 precludes the94
introduction of a plaintiff’s mental health records at trial.   Thus, even95
though a plaintiff places his mental state at issue in a case, a defendant
is not permitted to obtain or use a plaintiff’s medical records to challenge
evidence of causation.96
The harshness of these rules might be mitigated if a defendant could
obtain independent expert evidence of a plaintiff’s psychological condi-
tion under Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in part:
When the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of a
party, or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of a party, is
in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party
to submit to a physical or mental examination . . . .97
Alabama trial courts, however, routinely deny these motions in cases
involving new homes and autos.   Thus, a defendant can neither obtain98
existing evidence concerning a plaintiff’s mental state, nor have the
plaintiff independently evaluated by an expert.
At trial, a plaintiff in Alabama proves mental anguish damages by of-
fering testimony about how the problems with the house or auto made
him feel from a subjective standpoint. Typical testimony includes state-
ments that the problems made the plaintiff feel mad, embarrassed,
angry,  nervous, stressed-out, edgy, anxious, afraid,  frustrated,  disap-99 100
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So. 2d 712, 718 (Ala. 2002) (holding that a fear of contracting an asbestos-related
disease in the future does not support a mental anguish award, because such an allegation
does not state a claim under Alabama law).
Horton Homes, Inc. v. Brooks, 832 So. 2d 44, 53 (Ala. 2001) (citations omitted).101
Kmart v. Kyles, 723 So. 2d 572, 578  (Ala. 1998).102
The better practice is to require strong corroborating evidence of mental anguish103
in a property damage case.  In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans on July 9, 1982,
764 F.2d 1084, 1087-88 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that a strong showing of causation is
required since mental anguish susceptible to fabrication or exaggeration).
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals recognized the problem of proof of mental104
harm in a worker’s compensation case.  See, e.g., Fruehauf Corp. v. Prater, 360 So. 2d
999, 1001 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (“We recognize the possible difficulty of establishing
the existence of or the precipitating cause of any neurosis or psychic disorder.  We
recognize that there is a distinct possibility of attempted malingering in the absence of
objective symptoms.  We believe, however, that the difficulty of proof may be overcome
by the use of expert medical testimony and/or objective evidence.”).
“[A] buyer should be able to recover the full amount of consequential damages105
that are foreseeable or, in the case of injury to person or property, that proximately re-
sulted from a breach of warranty regardless of the disproportionate relationship between
such damages and the price paid [for the product].” JAM ES J. WHITE &  ROBERT S.
SUM M ERS, UNIFORM  COM M ERCIAL CODE § 10-4, at 454 n.60 (3d ed. 1988).
See, e.g., S. Energy Homes v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505, 509 (Ala. 2000) (a-106
warding, by a jury, more than $350,000 in mental anguish damages in a case involving
a single-wide mobile home that cost less than $20,000); see also Lay v. Postal Tel. Cable
Co., 171 Ala. 172, 53 So. 529, 532 (1911) (discussing the fact that wealthy corporations
open themselves up to unreasonable prejudice based on the sympathy aroused by a
mental anguish case; such a situation, in the court’s view, is to be “closely watched and
controlled by an even-handed bench”).
pointed, worried, annoyed, or inconvenienced.  Although Alabama once101
prevented a plaintiff from testifying about his own mental anguish, that
rule was officially abrogated in 1998.   Thus, the plaintiff’s own self-102
serving and subjective testimony is the basis for mental anguish awards
in new home and auto cases.  No corroborating evidence is necessary.103
Cross examination of the plaintiff can be a real problem.  Without the
ability to obtain and offer opposing evidence, a defendant has no realistic
chance of discrediting the plaintiff by showing that the alleged harm is
exaggerated or imagined.   In short, the plaintiff gets a “free pass” on104
issues of causation and damages.  Furthermore, unlike punitive damages,
there is no cap to the amount a jury can award, since the damages are
compensatory in nature.  Emotional testimony such as this is very effec-105
tive a trial.  Juries are sometimes led to award significant mental anguish
recoveries based on the plaintiff’s subjective testimony.106
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Pitt v. Century II, Inc., 631 So. 2d 235, 239 (Ala. 1993).107
Ala. Power Co. v. Harmon, 483 So. 2d 386, 389 (Ala. 1986).108
Kyles, 723 So. 2d at 578.109
S. Pine Elec. Coop. v. Burch, 878 So. 2d 1120, 1127 (Ala. 2003) (citing Kyles,110
723 So. 2d at 578).
State v. McCurdy Concrete, Inc., 507 So. 2d 403, 404 (Ala. 1987). 111
B&M Homes v. Hogan, 376 So. 2d 667, 676 (Ala. 1979).112
Alfa Mutual Ins. Co. v. Northington, 561 So. 2d 1041, 1048 (Ala. 1990).113
N.E. Ala. Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Owens, 584 So. 2d 1360, 1366 (Ala. 1991).114
Kyles, 723 So. 2d at 578.115
The “some evidence standard” conflicts with other Alabama laws.  For example,116
to survive a motion for summary judgment or a motion for judgment as a matter of law,
a plaintiff must offer substantial opposing evidence.  Day v. Williams, 670 So. 2d 914
Appealing a mental anguish award is very difficult.  Because mental
anguish damages are compensatory in nature, an appellate court must
focus on the evidence presented by the plaintiff at trial to determine
whether the verdict was supported by the evidence.  A plaintiff is re-107
quired to present “only some evidence of mental anguish, and once the
plaintiff has done so, the question of damages for mental anguish is for
the jury.”  Appellate courts apply a stricter level of scrutiny to mental108
anguish awards where the victim has offered little or no direct evidence
concerning the degree of suffering that he or she has experienced.   The109
plaintiff’s own testimony, however, may be considered direct evidence.110
A trial court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the jury
when the jury has returned a verdict that is clearly supported by the evi-
dence.   A trial court may not conditionally reduce a verdict merely111
because it believes that the verdict over-compensates the plaintiff.   Jury112
verdicts carry a strong presumption of correctness; that presumption is
strengthened once the trial court denies a motion for a new trial.   When113
there is no evidence before the appellate court of any “misconduct, bias,
passion, prejudice, corruption, improper motive” or cause inconsistent
with the truth and the facts, there is no statutory authority to invade the
province of the jury in awarding compensatory damages.   The jury’s114
award will not be set aside absent clear abuse of discretion.115
In practice, as long as the plaintiff takes the stand and testifies to some
evidence of his alleged mental harm, the appellate court will presume the
correctness of the jury’s award.  The plaintiff’s own self-serving,116
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(Ala. 1995) (summary judgment standard); Callaway v. Whittenton, No. 1020660, 2003
WL 22977433, **2-3 (Ala. Dec. 19, 2003) (judgment as a matter of law standard).  Sub-
stantial evidence is more than some evidence.
For a general discussion of the due process concerns associated with emotional117
distress damages, see Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational
Centerpiece of Our Tort System, 90 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1416-17 (2004) (“If juries are
authorized to award ‘damages’ for pain and suffering in any amount without a well-
defined purpose, how does a defendant have notice of the scope of a potential verdict?
Obviously, when damages are meant to compensate for ‘concrete loss,’ those damages
can be predicated with some degree of accuracy.  But without rational criteria or defined
limits, the pain and suffering award becomes the same arbitrary deprivation of property
as were punitive damages before cases like BMW of North America and Campbell.”).
In other types of cases, the general rule applies that precludes mental anguish118
damages in a breach of contract action.  See supra note 69 for cases disallowing recovery
of mental anguish damages for breach of contract.
subjective, and anecdotal testimony, which the appellate court deems to
be the best direct evidence available, can be used to justify a six-figure
recovery. As long as the plaintiff offers the “standard” litany of testimony
at trial–“the home [or car] made me sad, mad, or anxious, etc.”–then the
appellate court will likely affirm the jury’s verdict.
The confluence of pleading, discovery, evidentiary, and appellate rule
applicable to mental anguish claims makes such claims extremely diffi-
cult to defend in jury trials.  A plaintiff who never mentions his alleged
mental anguish in a complaint can breeze through a jury trial virtually
unchallenged with a realistic expectation of having his award affirmed
on appeal.  As long as the plaintiff can show a singular breach of warran-
ty or contract, and then testify to his alleged mental anguish, he has satis-
fied Alabama law for purposes of securing a recovery.  With substantial
money at stake, a plaintiff is too easily led to exaggerate the nature and
intensity of the alleged mental harm.  The fact that Alabama courts do
not require corroborating evidence of mental anguish virtually guarantees
that the plaintiff’s testimony will be believed by the jury and given
substantial weight–particularly since the pleading and discovery rules
preclude a defendant from gathering or introducing evidence to the con-
trary.  From a defendant’s perspective, this system represents the whole-
sale denial of procedural and substantive due process.117
The system just described applies only in contract and warranty ac-
tions involving homes and automobiles.  Only these industries are singled
out by Alabama law on mental anguish damages.   The perception118
among Alabama lawyers is that arbitrators are much more conservative
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See Terry Carter, Arbitration Pendulum: Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, Once119
an Easy Pass, Come Under More Scrutiny, 89 A.B.A. J. 14 (May 2003)).
513 U.S. 265, 115 S. Ct. 834, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1995).120
ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1975).121
Dobson, 513 U.S. at 265.122
than juries when it comes to the award of “soft” damages such as mental
anguish.  This, the authors argue, is precisely why consumer arbitration
agreements are more common in Alabama than in other states.   The119
new home and auto industries, which do not often use arbitration agree-
ments in other states, use them regularly in Alabama as contractual “tort
reform.” Arbitration, rather than being a symptom of an overly aggressive
business community, is simply a rational response to a bizarre rule of
damages and a skewed set of procedural laws that make mental anguish
cases virtually indefensible, both at trial and on appeal.
As addressed in the next Section, nearly half the Alabama appellate
decisions that have decided the enforceability of an arbitration agreement
since Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson  involve homes and autos,120
the industries singled out by Alabama’s bizarre Murphy rule on mental
anguish damages for breach of contract and warranty.
IV.  The Strong Correlation Between Arbitration
Cases in Alabama and the Murphy  Rule
The authors reviewed all of the reported cases in Alabama over the
last nine years in which Alabama appellate courts decided the enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements.  The Dobson decision was used as a
starting point. Prior to that time, Alabama courts applied Alabama stat-
utory law to strike down binding arbitration agreements.  Dobson,121
which held that arbitration agreements are enforceable under the FAA
whenever interstate commerce is involved or affected, cleared the way
for the use of arbitration agreements in Alabama.122
From the Dobson decision in 1995 until research for this Article ended
in 2004, Alabama appellate courts decided 359 cases in which the en-
forceability of an arbitration agreement was at issue. The authors organ-
ized these cases into seventeen categories based on the facts presented:
automobiles, banking, commercial construction, commercial contracts,
commercial vehicles, credit cards, employment agreements, funerals, in-
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See Appendix, infra, for a listing of cases and division of categories.123
Alabama appellate courts decided 79 manufactured homes cases, 56 automobile124
cases, 16 termite bond cases, and 20 site-built homes cases.  The number of Alabama
arbitration decisions involving homes and automobiles is also extremely high relative
to the number of similar cases in other jurisdictions.  Although the authors have not re-
searched the exact number of such cases in all jurisdictions, most state appellate courts
have reported only a handful (fewer than five in most instances).  See Thomas J. Meth-
vin, Alabama the Arbitration State, 62 ALA. LAW . 48, 51 (2001).
See Appendix, infra.  Footnotes within Figure 1 refer to cases discussing mental125
anguish damages within the categorical area of the law.
From the categories analyzed, this column illustrates the types of cases in which126
a plaintiff can recover mental anguish damages in contract or warranty claims under
the Murphy rule.  When this Article refers to the home industry as being subject to men-
tal anguish damages in contact or warranty actions, manufactured home cases, site-built
home cases, and cases involving residential termite bonds are included.
See, e.g., Volkswagen of Am. v. Dillard, 579 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1991) (holding127
that mental anguish damages are available in a breach of warranty of a new vehicle).
See, e.g., First Nat’l. Bank of Mobile v. Ducros, 27 Ala. App. 193, 195, 168 So.128
704, 705 (1936) (awarding no mental anguish damages in an action against a bank for
surance, leases, loans and mortgages, manufactured homes, nursing
homes, retail contracts, securities and investments, site-built homes, and
residential termite bonds.123
Cases involving autos, manufactured homes, site-built homes, and
residential termite bonds share a common trait: a plaintiff can recover
mental anguish damages in a contract or warranty action under Alabama’s
bizarre Murphy rule without a showing of actual physical harm.  In the
other types of cases listed, mental anguish damages are not available
under Murphy.  If, as the authors contend, the Murphy rule has led the
home and auto industries to adopt the use of arbitration agreements
across-the-board, then one would expect to see a large number of reported
decisions in which Alabama appellate courts decided the enforceability
of such agreements.  The authors’ survey of post-Dobson decisions con-
firmed this very fact.  Out of the 359 cases reported, 171 cases involved
the home and auto industries, in which the Murphy rule applies.124
Figure 1
Arbitration Cases Decided by Appellate Courts in Alabama125
(September 1995-June 4, 2004)
Reported Decisions Mental Anguish Claims126
Automobiles 56 Yes127
Banking 7 No128
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wrongful dishonor of a check). But see Sexton v. St. Clair Fed. Sav. Bank, 653 So. 2d
959, 960 (Ala. 1995) (upholding an award of mental anguish damages where a
residential construction lender could have foreseen that the property owners would
undergo extreme mental anguish if the loan disbursements were not properly monitored).
See, e.g., Wyatt v. BellSouth, Inc., 757 So. 2d 403, 408 (Ala. 2000) (holding that129
the plaintiff must prove an independent tort in order to recover damages for mental
anguish in an employment case).
Mental anguish damages are available in a contract action involving the mis-130
handling of a loved one’s remains.  See Gray Brown Serv.-Mortuary, Inc. v. Lloyd, 729
So. 2d  280 (Ala. 1999); CALAM ARI &  PERILLO , supra note 15, § 14-5.  Mental anguish
damages are equally available in burial or funeral cases pleaded in tort.  Bessemer Land
& Improvement Co. v. Jenkins, 111 Ala. 135, 18 So. 565 (Ala. 1895) (trespass); Cates
v. Taylor, 428 So. 2d 637 (Ala. 1983) (intentional infliction of emotional distress);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, §§ 12 & 54 (intentional infliction of emotional distress
and negligence).  The right to recover mental anguish damages in contract for the mis-
handling of a loved one’s remains pre-dated the Murphy rule by several decades. Brown-
ing v. Fies, 4 Ala. App. 580, 58 So. 931 (1912); Birmingham Transfer & Traffic Co.
v. Still, 7 Ala. App. 556, 61 So. 611 (1913); Deavors v. S. Express Co., 200 Ala. 372,
76 So. 288 (1917).  Modern funeral cases in which mental anguish damages are sought
appear to apply pre-Murphy decisions as a basis for recovery as opposed to the Murphy
rule. See Gray Brown Serv.-Mortuary, Inc., 729 So. 2d  at 285.  Thus, even though the
funeral industry appears to use arbitration agreements in Alabama, the Murphy rule does
not seem to be the cause of this trend. See SCI Ala. Funeral Serv. v. Lanyon, No.
1030337, 2004 WL1909350, **3-4 (Ala. Aug. 27, 2004); Kupfer v. SCI-Ala. Funeral
Serv., No. 1022002, 2004 WL 1418695, *1 (Ala. June 25, 2004).
See United Am. Ins. Co. v. Brumley, 542 So. 2d 1231, 1238 n.4 (Ala. 1989)131
(recognizing that a bad faith tort claim may allow mental anguish damages, whereas
breach of contract action would not).
Although mental anguish damages are not available in modern breach of lease132
cases, such damages were available in early eviction cases that involved claims of forced
racial desegregation (at a time when state public policy required segregation).  See Wyatt
v. Adair, 215 Ala. 363, 110 So. 801 (1926).
S. Energy Homes v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505 (Ala. 2000) (mobile home case).133
Commercial Construction 22 No
Commercial Contracts 20 No
Commercial Vehicles 8 No
Credit Cards 4 No
Employment Agreements 25 No129
Funerals 2 No130
Insurance 40 No131
Leases 6 No132
Loans and Mortgages 18 No
Manufactured Homes 79 Yes133
Nursing Homes 3 No
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B&M Homes v. Hogan, 376 So. 2d 667 (Ala. 1979) (holding that mental anguish134
is recoverable in a breach of contract involving a new home).
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Donavan, 519 So. 2d 1330 (Ala. 1988) (holding that135
a breach of termite bond will support a mental anguish recovery).
There is no practical way to gather statistics of arbitration awards involving home136
and automobile transactions in Alabama, because arbitration awards are not published.
However, at least three arbitration cases in these industries have been discussed in
reported decisions in Alabama.  The mental anguish awards in these cases appear to
confirm the anecdotal belief of practitioners that arbitrators award less money than
Alabama juries.  McKee v. Hendrix, 816 So. 2d 30 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (arbitrator
awarded $7,500 in mental anguish damages in a home case); Sanderson Group, Inc. v.
Smith, 809 So. 2d 823 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (arbitrator awarded $20,000 in mental
anguish damages in a mobile home case).  But see Waverlee Homes, Inc. v. McMichael,
855 So. 2d 493 (Ala. 2003) (discussing four mobile home arbitrations in which the same
arbitrator awarded nearly $2 million collectively in total damages).  The defendant in
McMichael argued that the awards were the product of arbitrator bias.  McMichael, 855
So. 2d at 500.  The Alabama Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court
for further findings relative to this allegation.  Id. at 507.  For this reason, McMichael
should probably not be relied upon as an example of what arbitrators typically award.
By contrast, during the same general time period, Alabama juries have been very
generous in doling out mental anguish damages.  See, e.g., Horton Homes v. Brooks,
832 So. 2d 44, 50 n.7 (Ala. 2001) (mobile home case in which jury awarded $150,000
in mental anguish damages); S. Energy Homes v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505, 508 (Ala.
Retail Contracts 1 No
Securities and Investments 22 No
Site-Built Homes 20 Yes134
Termite Bonds 16 Yes135
During that same time period, Alabama appellate courts decided 188
cases involving the enforcement of arbitration agreements in all other
contexts: banking, commercial construction, commercial contracts, com-
mercial vehicles, credit cards, employment agreements, funerals, insur-
ance, leases, loans and mortgages, nursing homes, retail contracts, and
securities and investments.  Thus, almost forty-eight percent of the cases
decided during this nine-year period involved the enforceability of arbi-
tration agreements in the two industries where the Murphy rule ap-
plies–the home and auto industries.
The authors submit that the abundance of cases in these two industries
is not a coincidence.  Rather, these industries reacted rationally and inten-
tionally to avoid jury trials in Alabama.  The perception among practitio-
ners who prosecute and defend warranty and contract actions in the auto
and home industries is that arbitrators generally award less money to
plaintiffs for mental anguish than do Alabama juries.   For this reason,136
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2000) (awarding approximately $355,000 in mental anguish damages in a mobile home
case); Liberty Homes v. Epperson, 581 So. 2d 449, 454 (Ala. 1991) (awarding
approximately $168,000 in mental anguish damages in a mobile home case).  Of course,
one need only count the high number of reported decisions involving arbitration appeals
in the home and automobile industries to conclude that lawyers regularly choose to fight
over arbitration in these cases.  There is no doubt that the decision to take or defend an
expensive appeal is motivated by the likelihood that juries will award higher mental
anguish awards than arbitrators.
ALA. CODE § 7-2-715(2)(b) (1975).137
the Alabama home and auto industries have generally required customers
to agree to binding arbitration agreements.  The home and auto industries’
widespread use of arbitration agreements in Alabama appears to be a
symptom of a flawed damages law doctrine.  In the authors’ view, this
decision is a function of these industries seeking to avoid the harsh
application of the Murphy rule before Alabama juries.
The next Section suggests methods for reforming Alabama’s substan-
tive mental anguish doctrine and procedural rules governing mental
anguish claims.
V.  Proposed Reforms
Our proposals for reforms are simple and straightforward.  With
respect to the substantive law of mental anguish, the authors urge
Alabama courts to apply already existing law.  The Murphy rule should
be rejected; in its place, Alabama courts should apply the Hadley II
“contemplation of the parties” test in contract actions and the standards
set forth in Alabama Code section 7-2-715(2)(b) in warranty actions.137
This correction will bring Alabama in line with the law of other states.
Alabama courts should limit mental anguish recoveries through the
mitigation of damages doctrine.  This doctrine is expressed in both
contract law and warranty law under the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC).  Alabama courts should also apply existing law that governs the
quantum and quality of evidence necessary to prove mental anguish
damages.  The aberrant “some direct evidence” standard should be
abandoned in favor of the rule of reasonable certainty, which is an
evidence rule that applies to all consequential damages claims, including
mental anguish.
Correcting Alabama’s substantive mental anguish law will necessarily
require a retooling of Alabama procedural law as well.  The authors’
164 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY [Vol. 28:135
208 Ala. 303, 304 94, So. 283, 283 (1922).138
5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN , CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1008, at 73-76 (1964); E. Allen139
Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM . L. REV. 1145 (1970).
Gerwin v. Southeastern Cal. Ass’n of Seventh Day Adventists, 14 Cal. App. 3d140
209, 92 Cal. Rptr. 111 (Ct. App. 1971) (citations omitted).
proposals in this regard are guided by due process concerns, which
require fairness in all aspects of civil litigation.  Pleading rules and, in
certain limited settings, the rules of evidence should be advanced in
accordance with substantive law.  Finally, the standard for appellate
review of mental anguish claims should be adjusted in keeping with
substantive law requirements.  The authors’ proposals are set forth
hereafter.
A.  The “Contemplation of the Parties” Test
in Contract Actions
The authors urge Alabama courts to apply the Hadley II “contempla-
tion of the parties” test when determining whether a contract claim will
support a recovery for mental anguish damages.  The Alabama Supreme
Court discussed this test in the pre-Murphy case of Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Swindle.
In order to justify the recovery of damages for mental distress it is
essential that such distress should have been within contemplation when the
contract was made. The [defendant] must have either knowledge or notice
that from dereliction of duty in the premises it is reasonable to anticipate
that mental distress may result.138
This standard has never been explicitly overruled in Alabama.  It remains
good law and should be revived.
Knowledge should be read broadly to include not only direct evidence
of what the defendant knew but also facts that the defendant had reason
to know at the time of contracting and not after.   This is a test of “rea-139
sonable foreseeability of probable consequences.”   This doctrine is con-140
sistent with the Restatement Second of Contracts, which provides that
a loss may be foreseeable at the time of contracting based on “the
ordinary course of events,” or “as a result of special circumstances, be-
2004] ALABAMA’S ABUNDANCE OF ARBITRATION CASES 165
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981).141
Id. § 353. 142
Id.143
Id. at Illustration 1.  The following cases apply the Restatement approach.  See144
Hancock v. H&M Constr., 808 P.2d 251, 258-59 (Alaska 1991) (holding a breach of
house construction contract will not support mental anguish damages, and citing cases);
Wise v. Gen. Motors Corp., 588 F. Supp. 1207, 1209-13 (W.D. Va. 1984) (holding a
breach of warranty claim involving an auto did not support mental anguish damages);
Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 23 Cal. App. 4th 174, 187-89, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371,
379-81 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding breach of warranty claim involving an auto will not
support mental anguish damages).
WHITE &  SUM M ERS, supra note 105, § 10-4 at 453, & §11-8, at 470-71.145
ALA. CODE § 7-2-715(2)(b) (1975) (emphasis added).146
yond the ordinary course of events, that the party in breach had reason
to know.”141
The two circumstances that will justify a finding of foreseeability
include evidence that the breach caused bodily harm, or that the contract
or its breach “is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was
a particularly likely result.”   The second circumstance is “exceptional.”142
According to the Restatement, this should include contracts of carriers
with passengers and innkeepers with guests, contracts for the carriage
or proper disposition of dead bodies, and contracts for the delivery of
messages concerning death (telegram cases).   Contract and warranty143
actions involving homes and automobiles do not fall within this narrow
exception.144
B.  The Doctrine of Proximate Causation
in Warranty Actions
Although the drafters of the UCC apply the Hadley II test in lost
profits cases, adopted in Alabama under section 7-2-715(2)(a), the code
rejects the test in warranty actions involving personal injuries under
section 7-2-715(2)(b).  Instead, the code applies the doctrine of proximate
causation to limit the reach of personal injury recoveries.   Section 7-2-145
715(2)(b) specifies that “[c]onsequential damages resulting from the
seller’s breach include: . . . [i]njury to person or property proximately
resulting from any breach of warranty.”   Note the code drafter’s choice146
of words–“proximately resulting”–in this section.  The Alabama Supreme
Court interpreted the phrase “injury to person” to include mental anguish
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Volkswagen of Am. v. Dillard, 579 So. 2d 1301, 1305-08 (Ala. 1991).147
Horton Homes, Inc. v. Brooks, 832 So. 2d 44, 50 n.7 (Ala. 2001) (holding that148
a consumer could recover mental anguish damages for breach of express warranty
without satisfying the proximate cause zone of danger test); Sanderson Group, Inc. v.
Smith, 809 So. 2d 823, 828-29 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (same).
WHITE &  SUM M ERS, supra note 105, § 11-8, at 470.149
Lindemann v. Eli Lilly & Co., 816 F.2d 199, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1987); Emguschowa150
v. N.Y. Steak & Seafood, No. CIV.A. 96-6252, 1997 WL 535867, *2-5 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
5, 1997); Reed v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 934 F. Supp. 713, 718-20 (D. Md. 1996);
Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017, 1027-29 (D. Conn. 1975);
Torres v. N.W. Eng’g Co., 86 Haw. App. 383, 396-97, 949 P.2d 1004, 1017-18 (Ct. App.
1997); Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Tel. Co., 271 A.2d 744, 750-51 (Md. 1970);
Divis v. Clarklift of Neb., Inc., 256 Neb. 384, 393, 590 N.W.2d 696, 702 (1999); Klages
v. Gen. Ordnance Equip. Corp., 240 Pa. Super. 356, 373, 367 A.2d 304, 313 (Super.
Ct. 1976); Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578, 587 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
Hanrahan v. W algreen Co., 243 N.C. 268, 270, 90 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1955);151
Yormack v. Farmer’s Co-op Ass’n, 11 N.J. Super 416, 78 A.2d 421 (1951).
Compare section 7-2-715 (2)(b), which employs the phrase “proximately re-152
sulting,” with the Official Comment 13 to section 7-2-314, which states “ [i]n an action
based on breach of warranty, it is of course necessary to show not only the existence
of the warranty but the fact that the warranty was broken and that the breach of the
warranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained.” ALA. CODE § 7-2-314 cmt.
13 (emphasis added).
damages.   Alabama courts, however, have never been asked to interpret147
the phrase “proximately resulting” in this context.  Although two Ala-
bama appellate court decisions have held that the Alabama’s proximate
causation standard does not apply in mobile home cases decided under
the Murphy rule, those courts failed to mention section 2-715(2)(b).148
There are no reported decisions in Alabama deciding what “proximately
resulting” means under 2-715(2)(b).  Its meaning is an open question in
Alabama.  The authors submit that the code drafters included the phrase
“proximately resulting” in section 2-715(2)(b) to limit the scope of a
defendant’s liability through the doctrine of proximate causation. 
According to the leading treatise on the UCC, the drafters intended
to import the tort standard of proximate causation into section 2-715(2)(b)
through the inclusion of the phrase “proximately resulting.”   Decisional149
law from other jurisdictions uniformly holds that the phrase “proximately
resulting” in section 2-715(2)(b) means proximate causation.   Even pre-150
code courts required proof of proximate causation to support a breach
of express warranty claim.   Alabama’s UCC supports this conclusion,151
as well.  For example, the phrase “proximately resulting” is used synony-
mously with “proximate causation.”  Furthermore, Official Comment152
2004] ALABAMA’S ABUNDANCE OF ARBITRATION CASES 167
ALA. CODE § 7-2-715 cmt. 5; see also WHITE &  SUM M ERS, supra note 105, § 11-8,153
at 468-74 (discussing the assumption of the risk and comparative fault as defenses to
a warranty claim based on the plaintiff’s contributory behavior).
The application of the doctrine of proximate causation in mental claims brought154
under section 7-2-715(2)(b) is also consistent with the leading Alabama decision inter-
preting this code section.  Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Dillard, 579 So. 2d 1301, 1305-08
(Ala. 1991).  In Dillard, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld a mental anguish award
in favor of a car purchaser who suffered a breach of warranty.  The facts in that case
showed that the plaintiff purchased a defective car that stalled in traffic and had several
“near misses” with oncoming traffic that placed the plaintiff’s life in jeopardy.  Id. at
1302-03.  The plaintiff established proximate causation when he proved that he was
placed in “immediate risk of physical harm” as a result of the breach of warranty.
716 So. 2d 1141, 1148 (Ala. 1998).155
Prior to Francis, Alabama permitted mental anguish recoveries in negligence1 5 6
actions only in cases where the plaintiff suffered an actual physical injury.  Hayes v.
Newton Bros. Lumber Co., 481 So. 2d 1123, 1124 (Ala. 1985) (citing B.F. Goodrich
Co. v. Hughes, 239 Ala. 373, 194 So. 842, 847 (1940)).
See WHITE &  SUM M ERS, supra note 105, § 10-4, at 453.157
5 to section 7-2-715(2)(b) states that causation may be an issue where
a purchaser fails to inspect a defective product, which means that de-
fenses such as assumption of the risk or contributory negligence may bar
a recovery.   These defenses would have no application in section 2-153
715(2)(b) unless this section required proof of causation under tort stand-
ards.   In short, the overwhelming weight of authority supports the prop-154
osition that Alabama courts should be applying the doctrine of proximate
causation to mental anguish claims brought under section 7-2-715(2)(b).
In AALAR Ltd. v. Francis, the Alabama Supreme Court announced
Alabama’s modern proximate causation rule for mental anguish damages
in negligence cases, which limits a plaintiff’s recovery for mental anguish
damages to two situations: (1) where the plaintiff sustained an actual
injury, or (2) where the plaintiff was placed in immediate risk of physical
harm by the defendant’s conduct (i.e., a “near miss” within the zone of
danger).  A plaintiff should have to prove one of the two Francis prongs155
to recover mental anguish damages in warranty cases, as well.156
C.  The Mitigation Doctrine in Contract
and Warranty Actions
In both contract and warranty actions, mental anguish damages are
also limited by the application of the mitigation of damages doctrine.157
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ALA. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 11.29 (2d ed. 1993).158
See WHITE &  SUM M ERS, supra note 105, § 10-4, at 453.159
ALA. CODE § 7-2-715 cmt. 5 (1975).  For an excellent discussion of how the doc-160
trine of proximate cause under U.C.C. § 2-715(b)(2) limits recovery when a plaintiff
acts unreasonably, see Erdman, 271 A.2d 744.
See WHITE &  SUM M ERS, supra note 105, § 11-8, at 468-74.161
See Ala. Power Co. v. Harmon, 483 So. 2d 386, 389 (Ala. 1986); S. Pine Elec.162
Coop. v. Burch, 878 So. 2d 1120, 1127 (Ala. 2003).
In contract actions, Alabama Pattern Jury Instruction 11.29 sets forth the
correct jury charge in this regard.
It is the duty of one (injured) (damaged) to exercise ordinary care to reduce
(his) (her) damages:  (he) (she) is bound to exercise such care as a reasonably
prudent person would exercise under like circumstances to reduce or mitigate
the damages.  (He) (She) can recover only such damages as would have been
sustained had such care been exercised.158
In warranty actions, the mitigation doctrine is embraced within the
proximate cause rule.   Official comment 5 of Alabama Code section159
7-2-715 sets forth the analysis the court should employ:
Subsection (2)(b) states the usual rule as to breach of warranty, allowing
recovery for injuries “proximately” resulting from the breach.  Where the
injury involved follows the use of goods without discovery of the defect
causing the damage, the question of “proximate” cause turns on whether it
was reasonable for the buyer to use the goods without such inspection as
would have revealed the defects.  If it was not reasonable for him to do so,
or if he did in fact discover the defect prior to his use, the injury would not
proximately result from the breach of warranty.160
This standard incorporates the tort defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk when determining whether a plaintiff’s failure
to act reasonably should bar or limit a recovery.161
D.  Standard of Evidence:
The Rule of Reasonable Certainty
Under modern decisions, Alabama courts apply the “some direct
evidence” standard when determining whether a plaintiff’s evidence is
sufficient to prove mental harm.   The authors propose that Alabama162
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See generally Kmart Corp. v. Kyles, 723 So. 2d 572 (Ala. 1998).163
E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH , CONTRACTS § 12.15, at 921-22 (2d ed. 1990); Man-164
nington Wood Floors, Inc. v. Port Epes Transport, Inc., 669 So. 2d 817, 823 (Ala. 1995)
(recognizing that the rule of reasonable certainty applies in contract claims where
consequential damages are sought); ALA. CODE § 7-2-715(2)(b) cmt. 4 (1975) (rule of
certainty applies in warranty claims); WHITE &  SUM MERS, supra note 105, § 10-4, at
449-51 (same); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981) (“Dam-
ages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be
established with reasonable certainty.”).
FARNSWORTH , supra note 164, § 12.15, at 921-22; see also Mannington Wood165
Floors, 669 So. at 823 (holding that the rule of reasonable certainty requires a special
proof of consequential damages claims).
abandon this standard.  This standard has no grounding whatsoever in
the common law outside of Alabama, and was invented to reconcile
ancient Alabama common law evidentiary rules.  In place of the “some
direct evidence” rule, Alabama courts should apply the rule of reasonable
certainty, which is a special rule of evidence applicable to all consequen-
tial damages claims.   The rule of reasonable certainty already applies163
both to warranty claims under section 7-2-715(2)(b) and common law
contract claims in Alabama.164
The rule of reasonable certainty is a rule of evidence that requires a
higher degree of proof than the preponderance of the evidence standard
in cases where consequential damages are sought.
[The requirement of certainty] thus imposed on the injured party a distinctly
more onerous burden than that imposed by the ordinary requirements that
he make out his case by a “preponderance of the evidence” and manifested
a judicial reluctance to recognize interests that are difficult or impossible
to measure in money.165
In a contract or warranty action in Alabama, the rule of reasonable
certainty can be met if the plaintiff can prove one of three things: (1)
actual physical injury (like a broken bone, for example); (2) corroborating
medical evidence of a mental injury (lay testimony concerning the
plaintiff’s emotional state is insufficient); or (3) tortious breach of
contract, which requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant is guilty
of an independent tort that permits a mental anguish recovery.
There is a substantial difference between feeling concerned, depressed,
and apprehensive and being diagnosed and treated for clinical depression
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See Mitchell v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 536 So. 2d 934 (Ala. 1988) (distinguish-166
ing between a mental disturbance that qualifies as an injury under Article I, Section 13
of the Alabama Constitution, as opposed to mental disturbance that is not a recognized
injury under the Alabama Constitution).
Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Martini, 2 Ala. App. 652, 56 So. 830 (1911)167
(citation omitted).  The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981) agrees
with the view that physical injury will support a mental anguish claim in a breach of
contract action.  Murphy also mentions that a plaintiff may recover mental anguish
damages if he is personally injured.  Murphy, 141 So. at 657.
Wal-Mart Store, Inc. v. Bowers, 752 So. 2d 1201 (Ala. 1999) (holding that the168
insult and contumely standard does not apply to negligence actions in Alabama involving
only property damage; instead, the zone of danger doctrine applies); Reinhardt Motors,
Inc. v. Boston, 516 So. 2d 509, 511 (Ala. 1986) (holding that property damage must
be occasioned by insult or contumely to support a mental anguish award).
Roes v. FHP, Inc., 91 Haw. 470, 474 n.6, 985 P.2d 661, 665, n.6 (1999) (holding169
emotional distress arising out of property damage is precluded by statute unless the
plaintiff proves actual physical injury or mental illness); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d
or some other real mental injury.  “Feelings” are a state of mind–not an
injury.   The task of the law, therefore, is to provide meaningful166
standards to make the distinction between hurt feelings and actionable
damage.  This task is particularly difficult in contract and warranty
actions in which the basis of the injury is mere property damage.
When mental anguish is predicated on a physical injury, such a claim
will always satisfy the rule of certainty since the physical injury serves
to authenticate the accompanying mental suffering:
Where there has been a physical injury to a person, under circumstances
warranting the recovery of compensatory damages therefor, mental suffering,
which is a natural incident thereto, furnishes one of the elements of
recoverable damages, and in such case the jury may always consider the
element of mental suffering and award compensation therefor.  The body
and mind are so closely connected that the mind is, of necessity, affected
by an injury to the body.167
Absent proof of physical harm, additional proof is necessary to meet
the reasonable certainty standard.  For example, in tort actions in Ala-
bama, mere property damage–standing alone–will never support a mental
anguish award.   Even those jurisdictions that permit mental anguish168
recoveries in cases alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress
require evidence of physical injury, mental illness, or at least physical
symptoms to support a recovery.   This is the case because the existence169
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104, 107 (Iowa 1981) (stating that “compensable mental distress should ordinarily be
accompanied with physical manifestations of the distress”); Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., 401 A.2d 148, 154-55 (Me. 1979) (holding recovery for the negligent infliction
of emotional distress is permitted only where the plaintiff proves physical injury or
substantial distress manifested by objective symptomatology); Corso v. Merrill, 119
N.H. 647, 659, 406 A.2d 300, 308 (1979) (holding that mental harm is not actionable
in a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress unless it is accompanied by
objective physical symptoms).
Jones v. Fortner, 507 So. 2d 908, 910 (Ala. 1987); Collins v. Wingham, 277 Ala.170
129, 132-33, 167 So. 2d 690, 693-94 (1964); 22 AM . JUR. 2D  Damages § 765 (1964);
Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Necessity of Expert Testimony on Issue of Permanence
of Injury and Future Pain and Suffering, 20 A.L.R.5th 1 (1994).
The rule of reasonable certainty differs somewhat in contract as opposed to tort171
claims.  In contract, “[d]amages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the
evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981).  In tort, “[o]ne to whom another has tortiously caused harm
is entitled to compensatory damages for the harm if, but only if, he establishes by proof
of mere property damages cannot corroborate mental injury.  No self-
respecting psychologist ever would diagnose mental injury by asking the
patient, “Does your roof leak?”  Yet this is precisely how Alabama juries
are asked to decide whether to award mental anguish damages when the
rule of reasonable certainty is not applied: the existence of property
damage is the determining factor for awarding damages for mental harm.
When actual physical harm is not present, the rule of reasonable
certainty will still support a mental anguish recovery if the plaintiff can
offer either corroborating medical evidence of mental injury, or evidence
that the defendant committed a tort that would permit the recovery of
damages for mental harm.  Examples applying both of these principles
in Alabama law are discussed in the next paragraphs.
When a plaintiff seeks future mental anguish in a tort case, the law
requires proof by a reasonable certainty, which requires corroborating
medical testimony. This standard applies because the issue of whether
someone will suffer future mental anguish–even where the claim is based
on actual physical harm–is highly subjective.   The same concerns apply170
to past and present mental anguish in a case where the plaintiff suffers
no physical injury, when the only fact that anchors the claim for mental
harm is mere property damage.  Past or present mental anguish predicated
on mere property damage is just as subjective as future mental anguish
based on a physical injury, if not more so.  The rule of reasonable
certainty should be applied for this reason.171
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the extent of the harm and the amount of money representing adequate compensation
with as much certainty as the nature of the tort and the circumstances permit.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (1979).
11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2000).172
See Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 257 B.R. 245, 249 (N.D. Ill. 2000); In re173
Sumpter, 171 B.R. 835, 844 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).
Aiello, 257 B.R. 245; In re Sumpter, 171 B.R. 835.174
In re Bryant, 294 B.R. 791, 800 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2002).175
Aiello, 257 B.R. at 250 (quoting In re Crispell, 73 B.R. 375, 380 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.176
1987)).
Id. at 251 (citing In re Aiello, 231 B.R. 684, 691 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999)).177
224 Ala. 655, 141 So. 630, 657 (1932) (citing Vinson v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,178
188 Ala. 292, 66 So. 100 (1914)).
Similarly, under bankruptcy law, a debtor may sue a creditor for the
violation of the automatic stay under Bankruptcy Code section 362(h)172
for abusive debt collection practices, and obtain mental anguish damages
if such damages are proven with reasonable certainty.   Illinois173
bankruptcy courts fashioned this rule.   This standard has been accepted174
elsewhere, including Alabama.   A majority rule has emerged that175
defines how a plaintiff proves mental anguish to a reasonable certainty.
Mental distress “must be more than ‘fleeting, inconsequential, and
medically insignificant’ to be compensable.”   “[T]here must be some176
medical or other corroborating evidence to support the debtor’s claim
which shows that the debtor suffered something more than just fleeting
and inconsequential distress, embarrassment, humiliation and annoy-
ance.”177
Thus, similar to tort law, bankruptcy law requires mental anguish to
be proven with corroborating medical evidence in order to meet the
reasonable certainty standard.  There is no reason that the rule of
reasonable certainty in contract or warranty actions in Alabama should
demand anything less.
The third and final item of proof that will satisfy the reasonable
certainty standard is proof of an independent tort that qualifies the
plaintiff for a recovery separate and apart from contract doctrine.  In F.
Becker Asphaltum Roofing Co. v. Murphy, the Alabama Supreme Court
held that evidence of “tortious” breach of contract will support a mental
anguish award.   The Murphy court described this standard as requiring178
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s conduct violated a tort duty in
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Murphy, 141 So. at 632 (involving facts establishing that the defendant was also179
“negligent” in the performance of the duty).  The tortious breach of contract standard
also was discussed in Thagard v. Vafes in the context of the breach of a physician’s
contractual duty that resulted in the death of a patient.  218 Ala. 609, 119 So. 647 (1928).
11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2000).180
Bryant, 294 B.R. at 800; In re Taylor, 263 B.R. 139, 152-53 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.181
2001); Aiello, 231 B.R. at 691 (citations omitted).
AALAR Ltd. v. Francis, 716 So. 2d 1141, 1148 (Ala. 1998); see also Ex parte182
Grand Manor, Inc., 778 So. 2d 173, 179 (Ala. 2000) (involving plaintiffs who could not
recover mental anguish damages in a mobile home case under a negligence theory
because they did not prove physical injury or immediate risk of physical harm).
Am. Rd. Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361, 365 (Ala. 1980).183
addition to a contract duty.   This holding was separate from the court’s179
pronouncement of the Murphy rule, which this Article has shown was
based on a misreading of a legal encyclopedia article.  The reasonable
certainty standard is met when there is an independent tort, since a jury
can infer that a plaintiff would suffer mental harm when the defendant’s
conduct is sufficiently egregious.  This rule is consistent with Bankruptcy
Code section 362(h)  claims as well, which permit a mental anguish180
recovery where the creditor’s conduct is so egregious and extreme that
mental harm can be presumed objectively.181
Alabama law has several well-developed doctrines for determining
whether to award mental anguish damages in tort actions.  These
standards share a common aim: they are designed to authenticate mental
harm by requiring proof of certain kinds of conduct from which a jury
can infer that mental harm reasonably resulted.  Stated differently, the
defendant’s conduct has to be sufficiently bad that a reasonable plaintiff
would likely experience mental injury as a result.  The following is a
summary of Alabama’s mental anguish standards in this regard.
(1)  In a negligence case, a plaintiff must show actual physical injury
or immediate risk of physical harm within the “zone of danger.”182
(2)  In an outrage case (intentional infliction of emotional distress),
a plaintiff must show distress “so severe that no reasonable person could
be expected to endure it” and conduct “so outrageous in character and
so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and
to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
society.”183
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New Plan Realty Trust v. Morgan, 792 So. 2d 351, 364 (Ala. 2000).184
Powell v. Bingham, 29 Ala. App. 248, 196 So. 154 (1940).185
Seale v. Pearson, 736 So. 2d 1108, 1113 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).186
Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So. 2d 824, 831, 836 (Ala. 1999).187
Alfa Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 738 So. 2d 815, 822 (Ala. 1999).188
Reserve Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Crowell, 614 So. 2d 1005, 1011-12 (Ala. 1993).189
Mitchell v. Winn-Dixie, 536 So. 2d 934, 936 (Ala. 1988) (“The law cannot190
entertain such claims as this if our legal system is to avoid collapse from the burdens
placed upon it by an increasingly litigious society.”).
See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 764 F.2d191
1084, 1087-88 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that a strong showing of causation is required
because mental anguish is subjective and susceptible to fabrication or exaggeration).
(3)  In a trespass or conversion case, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant acted under circumstances of insult or contumely to recover
mental anguish damages.184
(4)  In an assault and battery case, mental anguish damages are recov-
erable generally; however, these cases involve battery (i.e., facts in-
volving violence).185
(5)  In a nuisance case, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted
under circumstances of “malice, insult, inhumanity or contumely” to
recover mental anguish damages.186
(6)  In a malicious prosecution case, a plaintiff may recover mental
anguish, provided all the elements of the cause of action are proven,
including substantial evidence that the defendant acted without probable
cause and with malice.187
(7)  In an insurance bad faith case, mental anguish damages are
recoverable provided the plaintiff proves that the defendant intentionally
refused to pay the claim and, in a “normal” case, that the plaintiff is
entitled to a directed verdict on the contract claim.188
(8)  In a fraud case, a plaintiff may recover mental anguish damages
on proof that the defendant committed “willful” fraud.189
In each setting, there must be something more than the breach of an
ordinary legal duty to substantiate the authenticity of a mental anguish
claim.  If “hurt feelings” alone were actionable, then the courts would
be overrun with litigation.190
The preceding discussion illustrates that mental anguish damages
claims must be proven with reasonable certainty.  Mere property damage,
coupled with the plaintiff’s self-serving testimony, should never be
sufficient evidence to prove the existence of mental anguish.191
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156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).192
628 So. 2d  923, 924 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993).193
ALA. R. CIV. P. 9(g); see also June Rodd T/A the Studio of Havelock v. W.H. King194
Drug Co., 30 N.C. App. 564, 228 S.E.2d 35 (1976) (holding special damages under
section 2-715(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code must be specially pleaded under Rule
9(g)).
Williams v. The Gillette Co., No. 3:02 CV 2213, 2004 WL 717173 (D. Conn. Mar.195
24, 2004) (finding the privilege waived when plaintiff commences an action for recovery
E.  Procedural Reforms
Bringing Alabama substantive law in line with controlling authorities
will require an adjustment to procedural law as well.  Hadley v. Baxen-
dale and its progeny correctly teach that mental anguish damages in
contract are considered special or consequential damages –not general192
damages, as the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals incorrectly concluded
in Walker Builders, Inc. v. Lykens.   As such, mental anguish damages193
should be governed by Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 9(g), which
requires special damages to be specifically pleaded in the complaint.194
The pleading rules associated with special damages should be applied
to mental anguish claims in contract and warranty actions.
Rules governing the discovery and admissibility of evidence should
be modified to address due process concerns.  The rule of reasonable
certainty permits a plaintiff to prove mental injury through evidence of
(1) actual physical injury; (2) corroborating medical evidence of a mental
injury; or (3) tortious breach of contract or warranty, which requires the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant is guilty of an independent tort that
permits a mental anguish recovery.  When a plaintiff’s case can be made
through evidence of actual physical injury or tortious breach of contract
or warranty, both plaintiff and defendant have equal access to relevant
discoverable evidence.  In the case of a physical injury, the plaintiff’s
medical records can be subpoenaed.  In the case of an independent tort,
both sides can gather and introduce opposing evidence on the facts giving
rise to the tort.  Thus, no procedural reforms are necessary.
However, whenever the plaintiff proves mental harm with corroborat-
ing evidence of mental harm, through psychological or psychiatric expert
testimony, for example, the defendant should have equal access to similar
proof.  The plaintiff should be held to have waived his psychotherapist-
patient privilege by placing his mental state at issue.   Furthermore, the195
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based on mental condition); Lanning v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., Nos. Civ. A. 97-593 &
Civ. A. 97-1161, 1997 WL 597905 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1997) (holding that a claim for
emotional injury waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege); Torretto v. I.B. Diffusion
L.P., No. 92 C 2758, 1996 WL 563540 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 30, 1996) (finding the privilege
waived when the plaintiff alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress); Topol v.
Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., 160 F.R.D. 476, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding the
psychotherapist-patient privilege waived when the plaintiff alleges emotional distress
in the complaint); Suggs v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 86 Civ. 2774, 1991 WL 73972
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); Sheff v. Mayo, 645 So. 2d 181 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994) (same).
But see Morrissette v. Kennebec County, No. Civ. 01-01-B-S, 2001 WL 969014 (D.
Me. Aug. 21, 2001) (order denying disclosure of mental health records in an action
seeking to recover damages for emotional distress).
Pearson v. Norfolk-Southern Ry., 178 F.R.D. 580 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (citing1 9 6
Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118-19, 85 S. Ct. 234, 243, 13 L. Ed. 2d 152,
162 (1964)).
defendant should be permitted to have the plaintiff evaluated by an
independent mental health professional so that an opposing point of view
can be offered at trial.   This would give both sides adequate due196
process.
Finally, because the rule of reasonable certainty governs the quantum
and quality of evidence necessary to make a case for mental anguish,
Alabama’s appellate courts should apply this rule in lieu of the current
“some direct evidence” rule when evaluating whether a verdict comprised
of mental anguish damages is based on sufficient evidence.  Alabama will
no longer need the “some direct evidence rule” that it currently employs
to weed out spurious claims from the good ones.  Although that test was
well intentioned, it actually works very poorly.  Currently, the Alabama
Supreme Court considers the best evidence to be the plaintiff’s own self-
serving and anecdotal testimony.  Such evidence is very unreliable since
plaintiffs, through their own testimony, will almost always inflate the
duration and severity of mental harm.  Furthermore, plaintiffs rarely
admit to other causes for mental harm; instead, plaintiffs’ testimony
almost always emphasizes property damages as the culprit for mental
suffering.  With the “some direct evidence” standard eradicated, appellate
courts can focus a much simpler and more reliable test:  whether the
plaintiff’s evidence meets the rule of reasonable certainty.  The remaining
appellate standards will still apply.  A verdict should be upheld where
the plaintiff has established mental harm through substantial evidence
of an actual physical injury, corroborating medical evidence of mental
harm, or evidence of a tortious breach of contract or warranty.  The
2004] ALABAMA’S ABUNDANCE OF ARBITRATION CASES 177
W. Union Tel. Co. v. Chouteau, 28 Okla. 664, 673, 115 P. 879 (Okla. 1911)197
(quoting Wadsworth v. Tel.  Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S.W. 574, 582 (1888) (Judge Lurton
dissenting)).
appellate courts should remit a verdict under existing standards when
there is evidence of juror misconduct, bias, passion, prejudice, corruption,
improper motive, or cause inconsistent with the truth and the facts.
VI.  Conclusion
For a century, courts around the country have understood the danger
of permitting recovery of mental anguish damages in a contract action.
The reason why [mental anguish damages in contract should not be allowed]
is found in the remoteness of such damages, and in the metaphysical
character of such an injury considered a part from physical pain.  Such
injuries are generally more sentimental than substantial.  Depending largely
upon physical and nervous condition, the suffering of one under precisely
the same circumstances would be no test of the suffering of another.  Vague
and shadowy, there is no possible standard by which an injury can be justly
compensated or even approximately measured.  Easily simulated and
impossible to disprove, it falls within all the objections to speculative
damages, which are universally excluded, because of their uncertain
character.  That damages so imaginary, so metaphysical, so sentimental, shall
be ascertained and assessed by a jury with justness, not by way of punish-
ment to the defendant but as mere compensation to the plaintiff is not to be
expected.197
Despite this fact, Alabama embarked on an ill-conceived judicial
experiment, which has had unintended, but nevertheless significant,
results.  The auto and home industries, fearing catastrophic verdicts
before Alabama juries, now require customers, nearly across-the-board,
to enter into pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements as a condition
of doing business.  These industries have effectively divorced themselves
from the Alabama civil justice system in hopes of obtaining fairer and
more just awards before arbitrators.
Ironically, this unique trend is predicated on a simple mistake that
occurred in 1932:  The Alabama Supreme Court misread a legal encyclo-
pedia article and invented a contract doctrine that conflicts with state law
everywhere.  This change should be recognized and addressed.  This
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Article has set forth a number of proposals that the authors believe will
bring Alabama in line, not only with the law of other states, but also its
own law.  The authors are not advocating the invention of new contract
doctrine.  Instead, the authors urge Alabama courts simply to recognize
the mistake made in Murphy and apply already existing Alabama law that
works very well to achieve its aim: to distinguish between spurious
claims, which presently are taxed unfairly against defendants, and
legitimate claims where plaintiffs deserve real recoveries.
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Appendix
A Decade of Arbitration Cases Decided
by Appellate Courts in Alabama
(September 1995 - June 2004)
Automobiles
Dan Wachtel Ford, Lincoln, Mercury, Inc. v. Modas, No. 1022087, 2004
WL 759261 (Ala. Apr. 9, 2004) (compelling arbitration); Serra Toyota, Inc. v.
Johnson, 876 So. 2d 1125 (Ala. 2003) (remanding for arbitration); Capitol
Chevrolet & Imports v. Payne, 876 So. 2d 1106 (Ala. 2003) (finding no contract
for arbitration); Washington v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, 876 So. 2d 1103 (Ala.
2003) (affirming arbitration); Parkway Dodge v. Hawkins, 854 So. 2d 1129
(Ala. 2003) (remanding for arbitration); McConnell Auto. Corp. v. Jackson, 849
So. 2d 159 (Ala. 2002) (refusing to compel arbitration); Chesser v. AmSouth
Bank, 846 So. 2d 1082 (Ala. 2002) (granting arbitration of a contract for a used
vehicle); Mostella v. N&N Motors, 840 So. 2d 877 (Ala. 2002) (remanding for
a decision on the merits when interstate commerce is not present for the
enforcement of Federal Arbitration Act); Vann v. First Cmty Credit Corp., 834
So. 2d 751 (Ala. 2002) (affirming arbitration); Jim Burke Auto. v. McGuire,
826 So. 2d 122 (Ala. 2002) (compelling arbitration for a signatory defendant);
Keel Motors Inc. v. Tolbert, 821 So. 2d 963 (Ala. 2001) (denying arbitration
when the sale of a used vehicle did not substantially affect interstate commerce);
Credit Sales, Inc. v. Crimm, 815 So. 2d 540 (Ala. 2001) (compelling arbitra-
tion); Premiere Auto. Group v. Welch, 794 So. 2d 1078 (Ala. 2001) (remanding
with instruction for limited discovery before conducting a hearing on the
execution of arbitration agreements); Tefco Fin. Co. v. Green, 793 So. 2d 755
(Ala. 2001) (holding an arbitration agreement is not enforceable when interstate
commerce is not involved); Ex parte Lovejoy, 790 So. 2d 933 (Ala. 2000)
(holding an arbitration agreement was not broad enough to include an insurer);
Fountain Fin., Inc. v. Hines, 788 So. 2d 155 (Ala. 2000) (affirming the denial
of arbitration in an incident stemming from the repossession of a vehicle);
Capitol Chevrolet & Imports v. Grantham, 784 So. 2d 285 (Ala. 2000) (holding
an arbitration agreement binding for claims against a dealer and a manufacturer
because of an agency relationship); Parkway Dodge, Inc. v. Yarbrough, 779 So.
2d 1205 (Ala. 2000) (compelling arbitration with a dealer but denying arbitration
with a manufacturer); Williams, Inc. v. Ivey, 777 So. 2d 94 (Ala. 2000) (denying
enforcement of an arbitration agreement obtained by fraud); Ex parte Jim Burke
Auto., 776 So. 2d 118 (Ala. 2000) (granting limited discovery regarding the
agreement to arbitrate); Brebaker Motors v. Belser, 776 So. 2d 110 (Ala. 2000)
(denying the enforcement of arbitration as an action not within the scope of the
agreement); Mitchell Nissan, Inc. v. Foster, 775 So. 2d 138 (Ala. 2000) (holding
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an arbitration agreement enforceable); Crown Pontiac, Inc. v. Davis, 773 So.
2d 1005 (Ala. 2000) (holding an arbitration agreement in an unsigned contract
enforceable when the contract is accepted and acted upon); Jack Ingram Motors
v. Ward, 768 So. 2d 362 (Ala. 1999) (per curium) (holding a transaction was
not subject immediately to arbitration because of possible fraud in the induce-
ment of the agreement, and remanding for discovery); Ex parte Foster, 758 So.
2d 516 (Ala. 1999) (per curiam) (holding that an arbitrator is to determine the
issue of arbitration when an arbitration agreement includes disputes over the
enforceability of the arbitration provision); Premiere Chevrolet v. Headrick, 748
So. 2d 891 (Ala. 1999) (holding that a trial court decides arbitrability of claims
when the evidence is not clear that the parties agree to arbitrate disputes); Ex
parte Perry, 744 So. 2d 859 (Ala. 1999) (compelling arbitration); Ex parte
Payne, 741 So. 2d 398 (Ala. 1999) (vacating an order to compel arbitration as
a retail purchase order is not a binding contract); Jim Burke Auto. v. Murphy,
739 So. 2d 1084 (Ala. 1999) (holding an arbitration agreement not unconsciona-
ble when a purchaser failed to present evidence of any matters the court has
recognized as material to a determination of unconsionability, including the
inability to buy a car from another source without first signing an arbitration
agreement); Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. v. Jackson, 738 So. 2d 812 (Ala.
1999) (holding an assignee is not entitled to compel arbitration in the purchase
of a used vehicle); Ex parte Waites, 736 So. 2d 550 (Ala. 1999) (upholding an
arbitration agreement); Quality Truck & Auto Sales v. Yassine, 730 So. 2d 1164
(Ala. 1999) (holding arbitration enforceable); Value Auto Credit v. Talley, 727
So. 2d 61 (Ala. 1999) (reversing the trial court’s order denying a motion to
compel arbitration); Infiniti of Mobile, Inc. v. Office, 727 So. 2d 42 (Ala. 1999)
(holding an arbitration agreement binding on a third party beneficiary); Med
Ctr. Cars v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9 (Ala. 1998) (not allowing arbitration on a class-
wide basis); Tom Williams Motors v. Thompson, 726 So. 2d 607 (Ala. 1998)
(denying arbitration of claims of a nonsignatory party); Anniston Lincoln
Mercury Dodge v. Conner, 720 So. 2d 898 (Ala. 1998) (concluding the arbitrator
is to decide the question of arbitrability); Anderson Bros. Chrysler Plymouth
Dodge v. Hadley, 720 So. 2d 895 (Ala. 1998) (reversing the trial court’s denial
of arbitration where the dealer did not sign the contract); Ex parte Dan Tucker
Auto Sales, 718 So. 2d 33 (Ala. 1998) (requiring the initiating party to prepay
the costs of arbitration); Ex parte Dickinson, 711 So. 2d 984 (Ala. 1998)
(finding that a nonsignatory party cannot be compelled to arbitrate); Ford Motor
Co. v. Hall, 709 So. 2d 1198 (Ala. 1998) (per curium) (denying arbitration);
Ex parte Pointer, 714 So. 2d 971 (Ala. 1997) (holding an unsigned arbitration
agreement not binding); Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. v. Ross, 703 So. 2d
324 (Ala. 1997) (holding an assignee may enforce an arbitration provision to
which an assignor agreed); Carl Gregory Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Barnes,
700 So. 2d 1358 (Ala. 1997) (per curiam) (denying arbitration where a party
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did not agree to arbitrate disputes); Hurst v. Tony Moore Imports, 699 So. 2d
1249 (Ala. 1997) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state law);
Crown Pontiac, Inc. v. McCarrell, 695 So. 2d 615 (Ala. 1997) (holding an
arbitration is not enforceable in the purchase of a used car where the merger
clause nullified the contract terms); Coastal Ford, Inc. v. Kidder, 694 So. 2d
1285 (Ala. 1997) (compelling arbitration); Ryan Warranty Servs. v. Welch, 694
So. 2d 1271 (Ala. 1997) (affirming the denial of arbitration of a used car
mechanical repair agreement when the arbitration clause is an issue of contrac-
tual interpretation, determined by the intent of the parties, and the trial court
found a lack of intent); Ex parte Jones, 686 So. 2d 1166 (Ala. 1996) (denying
arbitration to an insurer where the contract was between a debtor and a creditor);
Med Ctr. Cars v. Smith, 682 So. 2d 382 (Ala. 1996) (denying a class certifica-
tion of an arbitration action where the parties were not similarly situated); Ex
parte Gray, 686 So. 2d 250 (Ala. 1996) (compelling a customer’s arbitration
in a dispute against a car salesperson even though the salesperson was a
nonsignatory party); Jim Burke Auto. v. Beavers, 674 So. 2d 1260 (Ala. 1995)
(denying arbitration where the dealer did not prove involvement of interstate
commerce); Ex parte Phelps, 672 So. 2d 790 (Ala. 1995) (compelling arbitration
even though the party moving to arbitrate had taken steps to litigate the claim);
Valley Fin., Inc. v. Owens, 733 So. 2d 439 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (holding an
arbitration agreement enforceable as between a debtor and a creditor); Crown
Pontiac, Inc. v. Savage, 723 So. 2d 1274 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (holding an
arbitration agreement includes disputes involving the condition of the motor
vehicle); Crown Pontiac, Inc. v. Charley, 710 So. 2d 435 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)
(denying arbitration when the dealer did not comply with the terms of the
agreement in filing for arbitration within the time limits of the contract).
Banking
AmSouth Bank v. Looney, 883 So. 2d 1207 (Ala. 2003) (granting a motion
to compel arbitration); SouthTrust Corp. v. James, 880 So. 2d 1117 (Ala. 2003)
(reversing the trial court to compel arbitration); SouthTrust Bank v. Ford, 835
So. 2d 990 (Ala. 2002) (holding contract claims subject to arbitration); Compass
Bank, Inc. v. Snow, 823 So. 2d 667 (Ala. 2001) (vacating a class certification);
SouthTrust Bank v. Williams, 775 So. 2d 184 (Ala. 2000) (remanding for
arbitration); Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. v. Rice Acceptance Co., 739 So.
2d 1082 (Ala. 1999) (affirming a denial of arbitration); Ex parte Indus. Techs.,
707 So. 2d 234 (Ala. 1997) (holding the stipulation regarding arbitration
unenforceable).
Commercial Construction
Huntsville Utils. v. Consol. Constr. Co., 876 So. 2d 450 (Ala. 2003) (holding
that the trial court erred in denying arbitration); Clement Constr. Group v.
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Coating Sys., 882 So. 2d 971 (Ala. 2003) (affirming a denial of arbitration to
individual capacity); Bd. of Water & Sewer Comm’r v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co.,
870 So. 2d 699 (Ala. 2003) (affirming a denial of arbitration); Mountain Heating
& Cooling v. Van Tassel-Proctor, Inc., 867 So. 2d 1112 (Ala. 2003) (finding
legitimate doubts that the parties intended to arbitrate the disagreements); Lee
v. YES of Russellville, Inc., 858 So. 2d 250 (Ala. 2003) (affirming a denial of
arbitration); Brown v. Pool Depot, Inc., 853 So. 2d 181 (Ala. 2002) (vacating
arbitration); Sadd Constr. Co. v. DPF Architects, 851 So. 2d 507 (Ala. 2003)
(holding the tort claims were not subject to arbitration); F.A. Dobbs & Sons v.
Northcutt, 819 So. 2d 607 (Ala. 2001) (holding an agreement not subject to
arbitration); Ex parte Allen, 798 So. 2d 668 (Ala. 2001) (remanding for
arbitration); Ex parte Messer, 797 So. 2d 1079 (Ala. 2001) (holding the claims
subject to arbitration); Massey Bros. Chevrolet-Olds-Geo v. W.E. Davis & Sons
Constr., 786 So. 2d 1093 (Ala. 2000) (holding the dispute should have been
determined by arbitration); Lee v. YES of Russellville, Inc., 784 So. 2d 1022
(Ala. 2000) (affirming a denial of arbitration); Sisters of the Visitation v.
Cochran Plastering Co., 775 So. 2d 759 (Ala. 2000) (denying arbitration),
abrogated by 539 U.S. 52 (2003); Ex parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d
153 (Ala. 2000) (denying a writ to compel arbitration); Rogers Found. Repair
v. Powell, 748 So. 2d 869 (Ala. 1999) (denying arbitration); Beaver Constr. Co.
v. Lakehouse, L.L.C., 742 So. 2d 159 (Ala. 1999) (remanding for arbitration);
Delta Constr. Corp. v. Gooden, 714 So. 2d 975 (Ala. 1998) (remanding for
arbitration); E. Dredging & Constr. v. Parliament House, 698 So. 2d 102 (Ala.
1997) (affirming a denial of arbitration); Ex parte Stallings & Sons, Inc., 670
So. 2d 861 (Ala. 1995) (finding no agreement to arbitrate); Harbar Constr. Co.
v. Willis, 871 So. 2d 97 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (remanding for arbitration);
Mountain Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Van Tassel-Proctor, Inc., 867 So. 2d 1121
(Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (complying with a Supreme Court remand to deny
arbitration); Mountain Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Van Tassel-Proctor, Inc., 867
So. 2d 1104 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (affirming the compelling of arbitration);
Dilsaver v. Roger’s Found. Repair Co., 866 So. 2d 551 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002)
(reversing an order compelling arbitration as not affecting interstate commerce).
Commercial Contracts
Memberworks, Inc. v. Yance, No. 1021460, 2004 WL 1178751 (Ala. May
28, 2004) (compelling arbitration); Northcom, Ltd. v. James, 848 So. 2d 242
(Ala. 2002) (remanding to compel arbitration); Monsanto Co. v. Benton Farm,
813 So. 2d 867 (Ala. 2001) (compelling arbitration for agents of the signatory
parties); Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., Inc. v. Integrated Med. Sys., 808 So. 2d
999 (Ala. 2001) (concluding that the tort claims were within the scope of the
arbitration clause); Birmingham News Co. v. Lynch, 797 So. 2d 440 (Ala. 2001)
(holding the claims subject to arbitration with exceptions); Marshall Durbin
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Farms, Inc. v. Fuller, 794 So. 2d 320 (Ala. 2001) (denying arbitration); Ex parte
Disc. Foods, Inc., 789 So. 2d 842 (Ala. 2001) (compelling arbitration);
Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 790 So. 2d 939 (Ala 2000) (compelling
arbitration); Ex parte Stewart, 786 So. 2d 464 (Ala. 2000) (holding the trial court
properly compelled arbitration); J&J Marine, Inc. v. Bay & Ocean Equip. Co.,
758 So. 2d 549 (Ala. 2000) (holding the agreement fell within the scope of the
arbitration agreement); Colonial Sales-Lease-Rental v. Target Auction & Land
Co., 735 So. 2d 1161 (Ala. 1999) (applying an arbitration agreement to both
the purchaser and the agent); Selma Med. Ctr. v. Manayan, 733 So. 2d 382 (Ala.
1999) (remanding for arbitration); Ex parte Conference Am., Inc., 713 So. 2d
953 (Ala. 1998) (vacating an order of arbitration); Morrison Rest., Inc. v.
Homestead Vill. of Fairhope, 710 So. 2d 905 (Ala. 1998) (holding the right to
arbitration was waived by filing a writ of mandamus); Ex parte Pope, 706 So.
2d 1156 (Ala. 1997) (holding no agreement to arbitrate dispute); Northcom, Ltd.
v. James, 694 So. 2d 1329 (Ala. 1997) (holding a contract requires arbitration);
Reynolds & Reynolds Co. v. King Autos., 689 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1997) (holding
an arbitration clause enforceable); Ex parte Birmingham Airport Auth., 678 So.
2d 757 (Ala. 1996) (setting aside an order of dismissal to reinstate action for
arbitration); Hill v. Nat’l Auction Group, Inc., 873 So. 2d 244 (Ala. Civ. App.
2003) (holding a nonsignatory bidder was not subject to an arbitration agreement
between the seller and the auctioneer); Matchmaker Int’l of Mobile v. Francis,
753 So. 2d 520 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (holding that a delay waived arbitration).
Commercial Vehicles
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Stokes, 885 So. 2d 119 (Ala. 2003) (affirming a denial
of arbitration); Wolf Motor Co. v. White, 869 So. 2d 1129 (Ala. 2003) (com-
pelling arbitration); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Stokes, 850 So. 2d 1239 (Ala. 2002)
(remanding for arbitration); Bay Lines, Inc. v. Stoughton Trailers, 838 So. 2d
1013 (Ala. 2002) (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the action); Kenworth
of Birmingham, Inc. v. Langley, 828 So. 2d 288 (Ala. 2002) (remanding for
arbitration regarding the purchase of a tractor-trailer); Ex parte Kenworth of
Birmingham, Inc., 789 So. 2d 227 (Ala. 2000) (vacating discovery in the arbi-
tration of claim); Kenworth of Dothan, Inc. v. Bruner-Wells Trucking, 745 So.
2d 271 (Ala. 1999) (denying arbitration as to the purchase of reflectors because
they were not part of the original purchase); Lipham v. Gen. Motors Corp., 665
So. 2d 190 (Ala. 1995) (preventing an award of mental anguish claims for a
commercial vehicle).
Credit Cards
Providian Nat’l Bank v. Screws, No. 1020668, 2003 WL 22272861 (Ala.
Oct. 3, 2003) (holding arbitration agreement binding); Ex parte Colquitt, 808
So. 2d 1018 (Ala. 2001) (requiring disputes to be resolved through arbitration);
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Perry v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank USA, No. CV97-218, 1998 WL 279174 (Ala.
Civ. App. May 15, 1998) (holding that class allegations will not defeat an arbi-
tration clause); Williams v. Direct Cable TV, No. CV-97-009, 1997 WL 579156
(Ala. Civ. App. Aug. 13, 1997) (granting a motion to compel arbitration).
Employment Agreements
Alafabco, Inc. v. Citizens Bank, 872 So. 2d 809 (Ala. 2003) (overruling
Alabama an decisional law that interpreted the commerce clause of Congress
too narrowly); Gayfer Montgomery Fair Co. v. Austin, 870 So. 2d 683 (Ala.
2003) (remanding for arbitration); Baptist Health Sys., v. Mack, 860 So. 2d 1265
(Ala. 2003) (holding a written agreement to arbitrate did exist); Ex parte Webb,
855 So. 2d 1031 (Ala. 2003) (vacating arbitration); Potts v. Baptist Health Sys.,
853 So. 2d 194 (Ala. 2002) (affirming an arbitration agreement); Ameriquest
Mortgage Co. v. Bentley, 851 So. 2d 458 (Ala. 2002) (reversing the trial court’s
denial of arbitration); Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Douglas, 826 So. 2d 806
(Ala. 2002) (affirming a denial of arbitration due to lack of proof of interstate
commerce); Dunigan v. Sports Champions, Inc., 824 So. 2d 720 (Ala. 2001)
(dismissing for lack of jurisdiction under the Alabama Arbitration Act); Selma
Med. Ctr. v. Fontenot, 824 So. 2d 668 (Ala. 2002) (remanding for arbitration);
Ex parte Walker Reg’l Med. Ctr., 825 So. 2d 741 (Ala. 2001) (dismissing a
petition for writ of mandamus until the discovery was completed on a motion
to compel arbitration); Gadsden Budweiser Distrib. Co. v. Holland, 807 So. 2d
528 (Ala. 2001) (remanding for arbitration); Ex parte Ephraim, 806 So. 2d 352
(Ala. 2001) (granting a petition to vacate arbitration due to lack of proof
regarding a substantial effect on interstate commerce); Ryan’s Family Steak-
houses v. Brooks-Shades, 781 So. 2d 215 (Ala. 2000) (denying a motion to
compel arbitration); U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Curren, 779 So. 2d 1171 (Ala.
2000) (reversing a denial of arbitration); Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. Argo, 779 So.
2d 1167 (Ala. 2000) (holding an employee’s claims subject to arbitration);
Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. & Annuity Co. v. Miller, 775 So. 2d 132 (Ala. 2000)
(affirming an exemption from arbitration); Ex parte Crisona, 743 So. 2d 452
(Ala. 1999) (upholding arbitration); Ryan’s Family Steakhouses, Inc. v. Regelin,
735 So. 2d 454 (Ala. 1999) (compelling arbitration); SouthTrust Sec. v.
McClellan, 730 So. 2d 620 (Ala. 1999) (remanding for arbitration); Gold Kist,
Inc. v. Baker, 730 So. 2d 614 (Ala. 1999) (holding an employee subject to
arbitration); Ex parte McNaughton, 728 So. 2d 592 (Ala. 1999) (denying a writ
of mandamus challenging the trial court’s ordering arbitration); Ga. Power Co.
v. Partin, 727 So. 2d 2 (Ala. 1998) (remanding for arbitration); Ex parte Hagen,
721 So. 2d 167 (Ala. 1998) (denying arbitration because claims are outside the
arbitration agreement); Ex parte Hood, 712 So. 2d 341 (Ala. 1998) (denying
arbitration on the grounds that the employer waived the right to arbitrate); Ex
parte Beasley, 712 So. 2d 338 (Ala. 1998) (vacating an order to arbitrate
because a form the employee signed did not contain an arbitration clause).
2004] ALABAMA’S ABUNDANCE OF ARBITRATION CASES 185
Funeral Homes
SCI Ala. Funeral Servs. v. Corley, 883 So. 2d 1206 (Ala. 2003) (compelling
arbitration for nonsignatory plaintiffs where their claims were reliant on
signatory claims); Servs. Corp. Int’l v. Fulmer, 883 So. 2d 621 (Ala. 2003)
(compelling arbitration).
Homes
Elizabeth Homes, L.L.C. v. Gantt, 882 So. 2d 313 (Ala. 2003) (remanding
for arbitration); Steele v. Walser, 880 So. 2d 1123 (Ala. 2003) (remanding for
arbitration); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Saxton, 880 So. 2d 438 (Ala. 2003)
(compelling arbitration); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Spraggins, 853 So. 2d 913
(Ala. 2002) (upholding an arbitration agreement as signed, written contract);
Brookfield Constr. Co. v. Van Wezel, 841 So. 2d 220 (Ala. 2002) (holding the
claims not subject to arbitration); Aronov Realty Brokerage v. Morris, 838 So.
2d 348 (Ala. 2002) (upholding the trial court’s denial of arbitration because the
defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that the agreement involved
a transaction affecting interstate commerce); Ex parte Kampis, 826 So. 2d 819
(Ala. 2002) (vacating an order of arbitration on the grounds that interstate
commerce was not affected); Ex parte Learakos, 826 So. 2d 782 (Ala. 2002)
(holding arbitration not to be compelled because interstate commerce was not
affected); Brown v. Dewitt, Inc., 808 So. 2d 11 (Ala. 2001) (holding that a
purchase agreement did not affect interstate commerce); Ballard Servs. v.
Conner, 807 So. 2d 519 (Ala. 2001) (holding that interstate commerce was
substantially affected to compel arbitration); Walter Indus. v. McMillan, 804
So. 2d 1081 (Ala. 2001) (affirming the trial court’s denial of arbitration);
Benchmark Homes v. Aleman, 786 So. 2d 1101 (Ala. 2000) (enforcing an
arbitration agreement); Thermo-Sav, Inc. v. Bozeman, 782 So. 2d 241 (Ala.
2000) (affirming a denial of arbitration); Thompson v. Skipper Real Estate Co.,
729 So. 2d 287 (Ala. 1999) (invoking the Federal Arbitration Act); Ex parte
Bentford, 719 So. 2d 778 (Ala. 1998) (vacating an order compelling arbitration);
Ex parte Warren, 718 So. 2d 45 (Ala. 1998) (affirming the trial court’s
compelling of arbitration); Ex parte Prendergast, 678 So. 2d 778 (Ala. 1996)
(granting a writ to deny arbitration); Lopez v. Home Buyers Warranty Corp.,
670 So. 2d 35 (Ala. 1995) (requiring arbitration on remand from the United
States Supreme Court); May v. Buchanan, 877 So. 2d 613 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)
(remanding for arbitration in the purchase of a house where termite infestation
was undisclosed); McKee v. Hendrix, 816 So. 2d 30 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001)
(affirming arbitration).
Insurance
Phila. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Bender, Nos. 1022141 & 1030029, 2004 WL
1233974 (Ala. June 4, 2004) (remanding for arbitration); Liberty Nat’l Life Ins.
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Co. v. Ester, 880 So. 2d 1112 (Ala. 2003) (compelling arbitration where no
proof of fraudulent inducement was presented); ECS, Inc. v. Goff Group, Inc.,
880 So. 2d 1140 (Ala. 2003) (directing an order for arbitration); Anderson v.
Ashby, 873 So. 2d 168 (Ala. 2003) (denial of a motion to compel arbitration
as an arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable); Cent. Reserve
Life Ins. v. Fox, 869 So. 2d 1124 (Ala. 2003) (holding an arbitration agreement
enforceable); Health Ins. Corp. of Ala. v. Smith, 869 So. 2d 1100 (Ala. 2003)
(ordering arbitration under the terms of arbitration agreement); Celtic Life Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 850 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 2002) (reversing a denial of arbitration);
S. Foodservice Mgmt. v. Am. Fidelity Assurance Co., 850 So. 2d 316 (Ala.
2002) (affirming arbitration); Mason v. Acceptance Loan Co., 850 So. 2d 289
(Ala. 2002) (affirming a grant of arbitration); Ex parte S. United Fire Ins. Co.,
843 So. 2d 151 (Ala. 2002) (issuing a writ of mandamus to compel arbitration);
Ex parte Celtic Life Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 766 (Ala. 2002) (holding an arbitration
agreement enforceable but a provision providing for punitive damages was
invalid); Porter v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 828 So. 2d 907 (Ala. 2002)
(affirming the judgment of the trial court in compelling arbitration); Voyager
Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 841 So. 2d 1216 (Ala. 2001) (holding the defendants
had waived arbitration rights with regard to one but not all members of the
putative classes); Modern Woodmen of Am. v. McElroy, 815 So. 2d 520 (Ala.
2001) (affirming a denial of arbitration by the trial court); Celtic Life Ins. Co.
v. McLendon, 814 So. 2d 222 (Ala. 2001) (compelling arbitration); Jericho
Mgmt. v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 811 So. 2d 514 (Ala. 2001); Auvil v. Johnson,
806 So. 2d 343 (Ala. 2001) (affirming the trial court’s denial of motions to
compel arbitration); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Woodruff, 803 So. 2d
519 (Ala. 2001) (holding a contract was not properly amended to require
arbitration); S. United Fire Ins. Co. v. Purma, 792 So. 2d 1092 (Ala. 2001);
Liberty Fin., Inc. v. Carson, 793 So. 2d 702 (Ala. 2000) (affirming a denial of
arbitration); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 790 So. 2d 922, (Ala. 2000)
(holding an arbitration award res judicata); S. United Fire Ins. Co. v. Pierce, 775
So. 2d 194 (Ala. 2000) (remanding for arbitration); United Wis. Life Ins. Co.
v. Beaty, 775 So. 2d 191 (Ala. 2000) (holding an arbitration agreement was not
retroactive); S. United Fire Ins. Co. v. Howard, 775 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 2000)
(compelling arbitration); Ex parte Handley, 775 So. 2d 141 (Ala. 2000) (issuing
a writ to deny arbitration); Celtic Life Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, 765 So. 2d 640 (Ala.
2000) (reversing a denial of arbitration); Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v.
Crawford, 757 So. 2d 1125 (Ala. 1999) (remanding for arbitration); Ex parte
Roberson, 749 So. 2d 441 (Ala. 1999) (issuing a writ to deny arbitration);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Leggett, 744 So. 2d 890 (Ala. 1999) (holding that
arbitrability was an issue for the judge not arbitrators); Ex parte Caver, 742 So.
2d 168 (Ala. 1999) (denying a writ to overturn arbitration); Woodmen of the
World Life Ins. Soc’y v. Harris, 740 So. 2d 362 (Ala. 1999) (remanding for
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arbitration); TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 739 So. 2d 1110 (Ala. 1999)
(reversing a denial of arbitration); Ex parte Shelton, 738 So. 2d 864 (Ala. 1999)
(upholding arbitration); McDougle v. Silvernell, 738 So. 2d 806 (Ala. 1999)
(holding arbitration binding); S. United Fire Ins. Co. v. Knight, 736 So. 2d 582
(Ala. 1999) (affirming the trial court’s denial of arbitration because the
defendant did not prove a relationship to interstate commerce); Universal
Underwriters Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 736 So. 2d 564 (Ala. 1999) (holding the
trial court could not require a dealership to initiate arbitration and to bear all
the costs of arbitration); First Family Fin. Servs. v. Rogers, 736 So. 2d 553 (Ala.
1999) (compelling arbitration with signatories); Ex parte Hopper, 736 So. 2d
529 (Ala.) (vacating an order of arbitration), vacated by 740 So. 2d 362 (Ala.
1999); Am. Gen. Fin., Inc. v. Manley, 729 So. 2d 260 (Ala. 1998) (per curiam)
(reversing the denial of arbitration); Ex parte Green Tree Fin. Corp., 723 So.
2d 6 (Ala. 1998) (vacating a class certification); Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co. of Tenn.
v. Jericho Mgmt., 722 So. 2d 740 (Ala. 1998) (reversing a denial of arbitration);
Mut. Assurance, Inc. v. Wilson, 716 So. 2d 1160 (Ala. 1998) (remanding for
arbitration); Ex parte Rager, 712 So. 2d 333 (Ala. 1998) (finding no error in
the trial court compelling arbitration); Stewart Title of Mobile, Inc. v. Montalvo,
709 So. 2d 1194 (Ala. 1998) (refusing to compel arbitration); Am. Bankers Life
Assurance Co. v. Rice Acceptance Co., 709 So. 2d 1188 (Ala. 1998) (upholding
a denial of arbitration); Ex parte Dyess, 709 So. 2d 447 (Ala. 1997) (finding
no error in compelling arbitration); Ex parte Smith, 706 So. 2d 704 (Ala. 1997)
(holding a dealer waived arbitration); Companion Life Ins. Co. v. Whitesell
Mfg., 670 So. 2d 897 (Ala. 1995) (affirming a denial of arbitration).
Leases
Serra Chevrolet v. Hock, No. 1021446, 2004 WL 870467 (Ala. Apr. 23,
2004) (compelling arbitration); Hudson v. Outlet Rental Car Sales, 876 So. 2d
455 (Ala. 2003) (holding the trial court determines the existence of an agreement
to arbitrate); Lanier Worldwide, Inc. v. Clouse, 875 So. 2d 292 (Ala. 2003)
(remanding for arbitration in a photocopier lease); Ex parte Cobb, 781 So. 2d
208 (Ala. 2000) (holding the arbitration clause was not enforceable in a void
lease agreement); Mangiafico v. Street, 767 So. 2d 1103 (Ala. 2000) (dismissing
for failure to initiate arbitration); Thompson Tractor Co. v. Fair Contracting Co.,
757 So. 2d 396 (Ala. 2000) (holding that the trial court erred in not compelling
arbitration).
Loans and Mortgages
Polaris Sales, Inc. v. Heritage Imports, Inc., 879 So. 2d 1129 (Ala. 2003)
(remanding for arbitration); AmSouth Bank v. Dees, 847 So. 2d 923 (Ala. 2002)
(remanding for arbitration); Conseco Fin. v. Murphy, 841 So. 2d 1241 (Ala.
2002) (remanding for arbitration); Vann v. First Cmty. Credit, 834 So. 2d 751
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(Ala. 2002) (affirming a motion to compel arbitration); Conseco Fin. Corp. v.
Sharman, 828 So. 2d 890 (Ala. 2002) (holding no intertwining exists to compel
arbitration); Ex parte Majors, 827 So. 2d 85 (Ala. 2002) (issuing a writ denying
arbitration as an invalid agreement); Alternative Fin. Solutions v. Colburn, 821
So. 2d 981 (Ala. 2001) (affirming a denial of arbitration as interstate commerce
not involved in the transaction); Am. Gen. Fin. v. Morton, 812 So. 2d 282 (Ala.
2001) (holding the transactions were not interstate commerce, thus denying
arbitration); Huntley v. Regions Bank, 807 So. 2d 512 (Ala. 2001) (affirming
a denial of arbitration); Ex parte Greenstreet, Inc., 806 So. 2d 1212 (Ala. 2001)
(limiting discovery in arbitration enforceability); Ex parte Greenstreet, Inc., 806
So. 2d 1203 (Ala. 2001) (ordering a hearing to consider a motion to compel
arbitration); Am. Gen. Fin. v. Branch, 793 So. 2d 738 (Ala. 2001) (affirming
the lower court’s denial of the insurer’s motion to compel arbitration); Liberty
Fin. v. Johnson, 787 So. 2d 704 (Ala. 2000) (affirming a denial of arbitration);
First Family Fin. Servs. v. Jackson, 786 So. 2d 1121 (Ala. 2000) (remanding
for arbitration); Ex parte Williams, 686 So. 2d 1110, (Ala. 1996) (directing a
reconsideration of an order compelling arbitration); Money Tree, Inc. v. Moore,
677 So. 2d 1170 (Ala. 1996) (denying a motion to compel arbitration because
the contracts involved did not contain arbitration provisions); Washington Mut.
Fin. v. Steele, 866 So. 2d 556 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (affirming a denial of
arbitration).
Mobile Homes
Harbor Vill. Home Ctr. v. Thomas, 882 So. 2d 811 (Ala. 2003) (ordering
arbitration under the terms of the retail contract as free standing arbitration
agreement was not fully integrated); Ex parte Horton Family Hous., Inc., 882
So. 2d 838 (Ala. 2003) (ordering hearing for motion to compel arbitration after
limited discovery); Cavalier Mfg. v. Clark, 862 So. 2d 634 (Ala. 2003)
(compelling arbitration with manufacturer but not dealer as ambiguities in dealer
agreements construed against dealer); Johnson Mobile Homes of Ala. v.
Hathcock, 855 So. 2d 1064 (Ala. 2003) (affirming arbitration of claims by
signatory party); Waverlee Homes, Inc. v. McMichael, 855 So. 2d 493 (Ala.
2003) (remanding for use of “reasonable impression of partiality” standard after
impression of bias); McDonald v. H&S Homes, 853 So. 2d 920 (Ala. 2003)
(remanding for proper selection of arbitrator); Stevens v. Phillips, 852 So. 2d
123 (Ala. 2002) (upholding compelling of arbitration); Lewis v. Conseco Fin.
Corp., 848 So. 2d 920 (Ala. 2002) (upholding the granting of finance company’s
motion to compel arbitration and remanding seller’s motion as entire transaction
satisfied requirement of interstate commerce); Bama’s Best Hous., Inc. v
Hodges, 847 So. 2d 300 (Ala. 2002) (upholding arbitration agreement under
proper procedure of direct appeal when buyer did not prove economic distress
when signing the arbitration agreement); Conseco Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Salter, 846
2004] ALABAMA’S ABUNDANCE OF ARBITRATION CASES 189
So. 2d 1077 (Ala. 2002) (overruling the trial court’s denial of motion to compel
arbitration); Ronnie Smith’s Home Ctr., Inc. v. Luster, 845 So. 2d 764 (Ala.
2002) (affirming denial of arbitration when appellant relied on separate,
contemporaneous writing extinguished by a merger clause in the retail
installment agreement); Belmont Homes v. Law, 841 So. 2d 237 (Ala. 2002)
(remanding for consideration of arbitration agreement in “Acknowledgment and
Agreement” contract to which both parties were signatories, rather than the
installment contract which was dependent on a merger clause); Conseco Fin.
Corp. of Ala. v. Slay, 839 So. 2d 617 (Ala. 2002) (dismissing appeal as not ripe
for adjudication after denial of arbitration as appellant requested relief for a harm
it had not yet suffered); Ex parte Cain, 838 So. 2d 1020 (Ala. 2002) (issuing
writ of mandamus relief to trial court’s order compelling arbitration because
manufacturer does not have proof of contract); Conseco Fin. Corp.– Ala. v.
Boone, 838 So. 2d 370 (Ala. 2002) (holding that mobile home purchaser failed
to prove absence of meaningful choice when purchasing mobile home subject
to arbitration agreement); BankAmerica Hous. Servs. v. Lee, 833 So. 2d 609
(Ala. 2002) (compelling arbitration but remanding requirements of allocation
of fees and means for selection of arbitrators as not consistent with installment
contracts); Ex parte Homes of Legend, Inc., 831 So. 2d 13 (Ala. 2002) (denying
a writ of mandamus for arbitration when the trial court had ordered an informal
dispute resolution while a direct appeal is the proper procedure to seek a review
of the trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration); Ex parte Cox, 828
So. 2d 295 (Ala. 2002) (granting writ of mandamus for vacating motion granting
arbitration to the manufacturer who was not a party to the sales contract that
contained the arbitration clause); Harold Allen’s Mobile Home Factory Outlet
v. Butler, 825 So. 2d 779 (Ala. 2002) (authorizing the trial court to appoint the
arbitrator when a provision in the arbitration agreement allowing the vendor
to appoint the arbitrator is unconscionable); Ex parte Tony’s Towing, 825 So.
2d 96 (Ala. 2002) (holding a nonsignatory towing company is not bound by an
arbitration clause in a sales agreement between the buyer and the seller, thereby
granting the towing company’s petition for writ of mandamus to proceed to
trial); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Channell, 825 So. 2d 90, (Ala. 2002) (remanding
for enforcement of arbitration clause of installment purchase agreement to
assignee); Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723 (Ala. 2002) (granting a writ of
mandamus vacating a motion to compel arbitration of express-warranty claims
and Magnuson-Moss Act violations, severing an arbitration clause prohibiting
the arbitrator from awarding punitive damages, and granting a motion to compel
arbitration of remainder of claims); Oakwood Mobile Homes v. Godsey, 824
So. 2d 713 (Ala. 2001) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a motion to compel
arbitration when the signature of the third party beneficiary bringing suit was
forged); Cavalier Mfg. v. Jackson, 823 So. 2d 1237 (Ala. 2001) (finding that
the Magnuson-Moss Act did not prohibit enforcement of arbitration agreements
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other than for warranties and a provision denying the arbitrator power to award
punitive damages unenforceable but severed from remainder of agreement),
overruled in part by Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723 (Ala. 2002) (holding that
a manufacturer violated the Magnuson-Moss Act by failing to disclose the
arbitration clause in its written warranty or its consumer manual); H&S Homes
v. McDonald, 823 So. 2d 627 (Ala. 2001) (allowing discovery to continue before
further motions regarding arbitration were considered); Ex parte Cappaert Mfg.
Homes, 822 So. 2d 385 (Ala. 2001) (issuing a writ of mandamus to arbitrate
when the rejection of the arbitrator by the buyers did not constitute a “lapse”
under the Federal Arbitration Act); Blue Ribbon Homes Super Ctr. v. Bell, 821
So. 2d 186 (Ala. 2001) (remanding to the trial court for an order of arbitration
when interstate commerce existed and the defendant did not waive its right to
arbitration by invoking the litigation process by filing a motion of removal to
federal court); S. Energy Homes Retail Corp. v. McCool, 814 So. 2d 845 (Ala.
2001) (granting a writ of mandamus to compel arbitration in the manner
consistent with the terms of the agreements between the parties); Green Tree
Fin. Corp. v. Lewis, 813 So. 2d 820 (Ala 2001) (remanding for an order con-
sistent with the opinion that the transaction involving a manufactured home had
a substantial effect on interstate commerce and the defense of unconscionability
did not make the arbitration clause unenforceable); Equifirst Corp. v. Ware, 808
So. 2d 1 (Ala. 2001) (denying arbitration when the contract contained the forged
signature of an appellee); Ex parte Early, 806 So. 2d 1198 (Ala. 2001) (ordering
the trial court to vacate an order compelling arbitration to allow the parties to
conduct limited discovery before ruling on a motion to arbitration); Ex parte
Smith, 801 So. 2d 837 (Ala. 2001) (denying a writ to compel arbitration); Ex
parte Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 798 So. 2d 656 (Ala. 2001) (holding that the
substantive arbitration provisions of free-standing instruments signed at the time
of the signing of the installment contracts could not be used to vary the
arbitration provision contained in the installment contract, but the defendants
were entitled to mandamus relief from an order compelling arbitration under
the Alabama Arbitration Act); Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Turner, 796 So. 2d
295 (Ala. 2001) (holding that the Magnuson-Moss Act does not preclude
enforcement of an arbitration agreement); Johnnie’s Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 790
So. 2d 956 (Ala. 2001) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted
Alabama law, that no duty exists to disclose the existence of an arbitration
provision when the signatory does not reveal illiteracy and that the arbitrator
will determine the validity of an arbitration agreement, and general contract
defenses did not prohibit the enforcement of an arbitration provision); Oakwood
Acceptance Corp. v. Hobbs, 789 So. 2d 847 (Ala. 2001) (holding the enforce-
ment of an arbitration agreement is a question to be decided by the arbitrator
and certain ambiguities are resolved in favor of arbitration); S. Energy Homes
v. McCray, 788 So. 2d 882 (Ala. 2000) (holding that the Magnuson-Moss
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Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act did not invalidate the
arbitration provisions in a written warranty); Fleetwood Enters. v. Bruno, 784
So. 2d 277 (Ala. 2000) (holding an arbitration agreement enforceable and not
unconscionable); Ex parte Meadows, 782 So. 2d 277 (Ala. 2000) (issuing a writ
for jury trial to determine the validity of a contract containing an arbitration
provision); Southland Quality Homes v. Williams, 781 So. 2d 949 (Ala. 2000)
(compelling arbitration as called for in the language of the contract between the
parties); Ex parte Brown, 781 So. 2d 178 (Ala. 2000) (holding an arbitration
agreement not an adhesion contract); S. Energy Homes v. Nalley, 777 So. 2d
99 (Ala. 2000) (per curium) (granting a motion to compel arbitration); Carriage
Homes v. Channell, 777 So. 2d 83 (Ala. 2000) (denying a motion to compel
arbitration); S. Energy Homes v. Gregor, 777 So. 2d 79 (Ala. 2000) (per curium)
(holding the purchasers were bound by the arbitration provisions); Harold
Allen’s Mobile Home Factory Outlet v. Early, 776 So. 2d 777 (Ala. 2000)
(holding an arbitration agreement enforceable); S. Energy Homes v. Davis, 776
So. 2d 770 (Ala. 2000) (per curium) (compelling arbitration); Homes of Legend,
Inc. v. McCollough, 776 So. 2d 741 (Ala. 2000) (compelling arbitration to the
extent of the arbitration agreement); S. Energy Homes v. Hennis, 776 So. 2d
105 (Ala. 2000) (holding that a manufacturer’s enclosure of an arbitration
agreement in a homeowner’s manual does not prove the purchaser assented to
arbitration when there was no attempt to enforce the warranty contained therein);
Ex parte Stamey, 776 So. 2d 85 (Ala. 2000) (upholding an arbitration agree-
ment); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Shoemaker, 775 So. 2d 149 (Ala. 2000)
(upholding an arbitration agreement); Big Valley Home Ctr. v. Mullican, 774
So. 2d 558 (Ala. 2000) (concluding that the defendant waived its contractual
right to arbitration by invoking the litigation process and not invoking a
contractual right to arbitration until the eve of trial); S. Energy Homes v.
Kennedy, 774 So. 2d 540 (Ala. 2000) (affirming the denial of arbitration to the
manufacturer as a nonsignatory party to contract between the dealer and the
purchaser); S. Energy Homes v. Gary, 774 So. 2d 521 (Ala. 2000) (holding that
conspiracy claims against the seller and the manufacturer were inextricably
intertwined and subject to arbitration), overruled in part by Jim Burke Auto.
v. McGrue, 826 So. 2d 122 (Ala. 2002) (applying to the extent that intertwining
is not sufficient for compelling arbitration); Oakwood Mobile Homes v. Barger,
773 So. 2d 454 (Ala. 2000) (remanding for an order of arbitration when the
appellant failed to prove fraud in the inducement); S. Energy Homes v. Ard,
772 So. 2d 1131 (Ala. 2000) (granting a motion to order arbitration when the
purchasers entered into a binding agreement to arbitrate and the Magnuson-Moss
Act does not invalidate arbitration provisions in a written warranty); S. Energy
Homes v. Harcus, 754 So. 2d 622 (Ala. 1999) (requiring the court to apply
Alabama contract law to questions of arbitrability); Green Tree Fin. Corp. of
Ala. v. Vintson, 753 So. 2d 497 (Ala 1999) (holding an arbitration agreement
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broad enough to include intentional tort claims when it was knowingly and
voluntarily signed by the purchasers); Homes of Legend v. Fields, 751 So. 2d
1228 (Ala. 1999) (per curium) (finding no contract claim to arbitrate); Green
Tree Fin. Corp. of Ala. v. Wampler, 749 So. 2d 409 (Ala. 1999) (holding an
arbitration agreement not unconscionable and to be presented to the arbitrator
to determine enforceability); S. Energy Homes v. Parmer, 742 So. 2d 159, 159
(Ala. 1999) (affirming that “‘[a]rbitration is matter of contract, and a party
cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute that he has not agreed
to submit’” (quoting A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Clark, 558 So. 2d 358, 362
(Ala. 1990))); Ex parte Smith, 736 So. 2d 604 (Ala. 1999) (holding that a
purchaser not reading the arbitration clause of a contract before signing it does
not render the contract unconscionable); Crimson Indus. v. Kirkland, 736 So.
2d 597 (Ala. 1999) (enforcing an arbitration agreement for claims arising prior
to the execution of the agreement); S. Energy Homes v. Lee, 732 So. 2d 994
(Ala. 1999) (holding that written and implied warranty claims are not arbitrable
under the Magnuson-Moss Act), overruled by S. Energy Homes v. Ard, 772 So.
2d 1131, 1135 (Ala. 2000) (holding that the “Magnuson-Moss Act does not
invalidate arbitration provisions in a written warranty”); Patrick Home Ctr. v.
Karr, 730 So. 2d 1171 (Ala. 1999) (holding that lack of mutuality of remedy,
alone, does not make an arbitration agreement unconscionable); Ex parte Parker,
730 So. 2d 168 (Ala. 1999) (upholding an arbitration agreement); Green Tree
Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 729 So. 2d 329 (Ala. 1999) (compelling arbitration); Ex
parte Napier, 723 So. 2d 49 (Ala. 1998) (upholding an arbitration agreement
for claims against nonsignatories because of intertwining); Ex parte Green Tree
Fin. Corp., 723 So. 2d 6, 10 n.3 (Ala. 1998) (stating that “arbitration agreements
cannot be forced into the mold of class-action treatment without defeating the
parties’ contractual rights”); Brilliant Homes, Ltd. v. Lind, 722 So. 2d 753 (Ala.
1998) (finding broad arbitration conferred upon the arbitrator the power to
decide the preliminary issue of arbitrability); Green Tree Agency v. White, 719
So. 2d 1179 (Ala. 1998) (holding claims of fraud in the inducement of the
contract subject to arbitration); Allstar Homes, Inc. v. Waters, 711 So. 2d 924
(Ala. 1997) (holding that arbitration of an issue of fraud in inducement of a
contract may be submitted to arbitration but only after the trial court rules upon
disputes regarding the enforcement of the arbitration agreement), rejected by
Ex parte Perry, 744 So. 2d 859, 863-66 (Ala. 1999) (clarifying that merely
alleging fraudulent inducement as to an arbitration clause does not allow a party
to avoid arbitration agreement); Ex parte Grant, 711 So. 2d 464 (Ala. 1997)
(holding an arbitration agreement within a worksheet estimate was not binding
as it was not a contract); Ex parte Isbell, 708 So. 2d 571, 585 (Ala. 1997)
(stating that “[c]ourts should not lightly do away with legitimate arbitration
contracts”); Ex parte Smith, 706 So. 2d 704 (Ala. 1997) (ruling that a dealer’s
delay of ten months in filing for arbitration while continuing discovery waived
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arbitration); Ex parte Martin, 703 So. 2d 883 (Ala. 1996) (holding that an
arbitration agreement between buyers and a seller was not applicable to the
manufacturer); Palm Harbor Homes v. Crawford, 689 So. 2d 3 (Ala. 1997)
(holding that a manufacturer waived the right to arbitration by not filing an
interlocutory appeal of a motion to compel arbitration); Ex parte Gates, 675 So.
2d 371 (Ala. 1996) (holding the Federal Arbitration Act preempted state law);
Oakwood Mobile Homes v. Carter, 846 So. 2d 1098 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002)
(remanding in favor of arbitration); Dynasty Housing, Inc. v. McCollum, 832
So. 2d 73 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (affirming judgment on an arbitration award
and denying a set-off motion); Sanderson Group, Inc. v. Smith, 809 So. 2d 823
(Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (rejecting the argument that a buyer could not be awarded
mental anguish damages for breach of contract without a physical injury or zone
of danger, as these are tort defenses, and affirming the arbitrator’s award of
damages for mental anguish).
Nursing Homes
Briarcliff Nursing Home v. Turcotte, Nos. 1012193 & 1012195, 2004 WL
1418698 (Ala. June 25, 2004) (upholding provisions of an arbitration agree-
ment); Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., No. 1021978, 2004 WL
260969 (Ala. Feb. 23, 2004) (compelling arbitration); McGuffey Health &
Rehab. Ctr. v. Gibson, 864 So. 2d 1061 (Ala. 2003) (compelling arbitration);
Cmty. Care of Am. of Ala. v. Davis, 850 So. 2d 283 (Ala. 2002) (holding an
arbitration agreement was not enforceable).
Retail
Ala. Catalog Sales v. Harris, 794 So. 2d 312 (Ala. 2000) (affirming a denial
of arbitration because the trial court is to determine enforceability of an
arbitration contract).
Securities and Investments
Edward D. Jones & Co., LP v. Wehby, 882 So. 2d 832 (Ala. 2003)
(remanding for arbitration when the appellant met its burden in support of its
motion to compel); UBS PaineWebber, Inc. v. Brown, 880 So. 2d 411 (Ala.
2003) (remanding for arbitration as the master account agreement contained and
arbitration clause); Hales v. Proequities, Inc., 885 So. 2d 100 (Ala. 2003)
(holding the right to arbitrate was waived by the failure to object to the trial
setting in a timely manner); Sec. Am., Inc. v. Rogers, 850 So. 2d 1252 (Ala.
2002) (holding that violations of the Alabama Securities Act rendered the
customer agreements unenforceable); Lewis v. Oakley, 847 So. 2d 307 (Ala.
2002) (ordering the dispute underlying the litigation to arbitration); J.C.
Bradford & Co. v. Vick, 837 So. 2d 271 (Ala. 2002) (finding valid contracts
regarding arbitration); Baker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
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821 So. 2d 158 (Ala. 2001) (holding that the preclusive effect of the prior
judgment was not arbitrable but was to be decided by the trial court, which
prevented the arbitrators from deciding the applicability of collateral estoppel
in the arbitration proceeding); Riscorp, Inc. v. Occupational Safety Ass’n of Ala.
Workmen’s Comp. Fund, 796 So. 2d 1062 (Ala. 2000) (dismissing a writ of
mandamus for arbitration); Bear Stearns Sec., Inc. v. Jones, 789 So. 2d 161 (Ala.
2000) (enforcing arbitration agreements except those not inextricably inter-
twined); Norman v. Occupational Safety Ass’n of Ala. Workmen’s Comp. Fund,
776 So. 2d 788 (Ala. 2000) (denying the nonsignatory defendants’ motions to
compel arbitration); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.  McDonald, 758 So. 2d 539
(Ala. 1999) (holding that procedural matters of arbitrability are to be determined
by the arbitrator); AmSouth Inv. Servs. v. Bhuta, 757 So. 2d 1120 (Ala. 2000)
(compelling arbitration); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kilgore,
751 So. 2d 8 (Ala. 1999) (compelling arbitration); Chazen v. Parton, 739 So.
2d 1104 (Ala. 1999) (finding no agreement to arbitrate); NationsBanc Inv. v.
Paramore, 736 So. 2d 589 (Ala. 1999) (holding the trial court must make rulings
on facts regarding the validity of a contract before granting or denying
arbitration); Inv. Mgmt. & Research v. Hamilton, 727 So. 2d 71 (Ala. 1999)
(holding that, when a claim of fraud in the inducement is directed toward the
entire contract, such issue is subject to arbitration); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kirton, 719 So. 2d 201 (Ala. 1998) (reversing and
remanding to compel arbitration); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Cobb, 717 So. 2d 355 (Ala. 1998) (dismissing the appeal of a decision
denying arbitration due to lack of timely appeal); Ex parte Stripling, 694 So.
2d 1281 (Ala. 1997) (compelling arbitration except for a nonsignatory party);
Capital Inv. Group v. Woodson, 694 So. 2d 1268 (Ala. 1997) (holding that an
agreement made before signing the arbitration agreement was not subject to
arbitration); Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Micro-Fab, Inc. 689 So. 2d 829 (Ala. 1997)
(denying arbitration); Koullas v. Ramsey, 683 So. 2d 415 (Ala. 1996) (holding
that claims did not arise under the contract and are not subject to arbitration).
Termite Cases
Cook’s Pest Control v. Hastings, 883 So. 2d 1207 (Ala. 2003) (remanding
for arbitration); Bowen v. Sec. Pest Control, 879 So. 2d 1139 (Ala. 2003)
(affirming arbitration); Sears Termite & Pest Control v. Robinson, 883 So. 2d
153 (Ala. 2003) (remanding for arbitration); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Larkin,
857 So. 2d 97 (Ala. 2003) (affirming the denial of arbitration due to lack of
mutual consent); Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., 854 So. 2d 529 (Ala. 2002) (per
curiam) (holding the arbitration clause that precludes class-action unconsciona-
ble); Cook’s Pest Control v. Rebar, 852 So. 2d 730 (Ala. 2002) (upholding a
denial of motion to compel arbitration when a contract modification was deemed
accepted); All Am. Termite & Pest Control, Inc. v. Walker, 830 So. 2d 736 (Ala.
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2002) (holding a homeowner waived the right to dispute arbitration by partici-
pating in an arbitration proceedings); Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Butler, 816
So. 2d 9 (Ala. 2001) (reversing the trial court’s denial of a motion to compel
arbitration); Watson v. Terminix Int’l Co., 810 So. 2d 689 (Ala. 2001) (vacating
a judgment of dismissal that should have been stayed during an arbitration
proceedings); Cook’s Pest Control v. Boykin, 807 So. 2d 524 (Ala. 2001) (hold-
ing an arbitration is not binding on a nonsignatory when intertwining was
nonexistent); Ex parte Morris, 782 So. 2d 249 (Ala. 2000) (upholding a motion
to compel arbitration); Am. Termite & Pest Control v. Riley, 775 So. 2d 179
(Ala. 2000) (affirming the trial court’s holding that arbitration cannot be
compelled on absent members of a putative class); Cutler v. Orkin Exterminating
Co., 770 So. 2d 67 (Ala. 2000) (affirming that only a named plaintiff with an
arbitration clause can represent class members with arbitration clauses in their
contracts); Ex parte Rush, 730 So. 2d 1175 (Ala. 1999) (upholding an arbitration
clause); Terminix Int’l Co. v. Jackson, 723 So. 2d 555 (Ala. 1998) (holding that
the defendants acted inconsistently with arbitration rights); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 684 So. 2d 102 (Ala. 1995) (reversing a denial of arbi-
tration for contract claims but denying arbitration tort based claims); Terminix
Int’l Co. v. Jackson, 669 So. 2d 893 (Ala. 1995) (holding that a termite company
did not waive the right to arbitration by conducting discovery).
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